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CORPORATE SALVATION OR DAMNATION?
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION

ON SELECTIVE WAIVER
Liesa L. Richter*
Recently, critics have attacked federal law enforcement policies that
encourage corporate targets to disclose sensitive information protected by
the corporateattorney-clientprivilege and work-product doctrine, arguing
that the policies are coercive, fundamentally unfair, and destined to chill
the free flow of information to corporate counsel. The most readily
apparent collateral consequence of these policies, however, has been
corporations' loss of privilege protection in subsequent litigation. Good
corporate citizens that have chosen to cooperate with the government in
this manner have been punished with broad findings of waiver and the
dissemination ofprotected information to companies' civil adversaries. To
protect companiesfrom this punitive result and to encourage cooperation
with law enforcement, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence drafted and published proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c)
to allow "selective waiver" of the attorney-client privilege and workproductprotection to federal entities without a waiver as to any otherparty.
On the verge of obtaining this protection, corporate counsel performed a
surprisingabout-face and argued against the proposal,complaining that it
would exacerbate the existing "culture of waiver" in federal investigations.
In the face of vocal opposition, the Advisory Committee declined to
recommend a selective waiver rule, leaving it to Congress to decide thefate
of selective waiver legislation.
This Article opines that selective waiver legislation would represent a
valuable palliative measure that would serve corporate clients and their
stakeholders, as well as the public interest, in effective corporate oversight.
It examines the federal policies that create corporate waivers, concluding
that waivers reflect a legitimate prosecutorial technique that is
indispensable in light of the mounting expense and complexity of corporate
investigations in the twenty-first century. The Article also demonstrates
thatjudicial rejection of selective waiver ignores the evolution of privilege
doctrinefrom a paradigm of rigid absolutism to one offairness andflexible
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author wishes
to thank Professor Daniel J.Capra for his invaluable comments on a prior draft of this
Article, as well as colleagues Kimberly Brown, Steven Gensler, Katheleen Guzman, and
Murray Tabb for their insightful assistance and support.
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party autonomy over protected information, concluding that selective
waiver can fit comfortably into this modern vision of privilege. Finally, it
examines the contours of appropriateselective waiver legislation.
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s, allegations of corporate slush funds and overseas bribery
rocked corporate America.I In the mid-1980s, the Boesky affair and insider
trading represented the corporate scandal of the decade. 2 At the turn of the
twenty-first century, fraudulent schemes at companies like Enron,
WorldCom, and Adelphia shocked the American market. 3 Now, in 2007,
the illegal backdating of stock options for the benefit of executives at
publicly traded corporations "has rapidly become one of the broadest
corporate scandals in decades" with "more than 130 companies under
federal scrutiny." 4 In short, complex and illegal corporate schemes are
nothing new and will be a recurring part of our legal landscape so long as
all
of
fallible human beings steer the corporate enterprise. Throughout

these scandals, the cooperation of the corporate entity has proven critical to

the successful and efficient investigation of the primary wrongdoers. 5 In
connection with the ongoing investigation of options backdating, The Wall
Street Journal has noted that "federal authorities can't possibly do thorough
examinations of every company" and that they "outsource a big chunk of
the job."'6 "Regulators and prosecutors are relying on suspect companies to
investigate themselves by hiring outside law firms. The firms are supposed
to hand over their findings to the Securities and Exchange Commission...

1.See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289, 295 n.7 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that many of the largest American corporations paid
bribes to foreign officials in the mid- 1970s to obtain overseas business).
2. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good
Corporate Citizenship," 76 St. John's L. Rev. 979, 999-1006 (2002) (discussing the Boesky
trading scandal and other corporate scandals of the mid- 1980s and early 1990s).
3. See Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizationsand the
Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 587, 587 (2004) (noting that "the most
prominent scandals... involve[d] Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, Tyco International,
and Adelphia Communications").
4. James Bandler & Kara Scannell, In Options Probes,PrivateLaw FirmsPlay Crucial
Role, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at Al; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Statement of Deputy Attorney General Paul J.McNulty, Former General Counsel of Monster
Pleads Guilty to Securities Fraud in Connection with Backdating of Stock Options (Feb. 15,
at
available
2007),
http://www.usdoj .gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/February07/olesnyckyjpleapr.pdf.
5. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 295 n.7 (explaining the Security and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) voluntary disclosure program, which encouraged corporate America to
"com[e] clean" in exchange for lenient treatment); Simons, supra note 2, at 999 (noting
aggressive efforts by General Electric to cooperate with the investigation of the Boesky
insider trading scandal that led to punishment of the individual perpetrators of the scheme);
Interview with U.S. Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice Policy on
Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Protection, U.S. Att'ys' Bull., Nov. 2003, at 1, 5 [hereinafter
Comey Interview] (discussing the importance of cooperation in resolving corporate scandals
of the twenty-first century).
6. Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4.
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or federal prosecutors" in exchange for lenient treatment of the entity.7 In
feeding federal investigators the results of such internal investigations,
entities often turn over information protected by the sacrosanct corporate
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. Should responsible
corporate entities that cooperate with federal law enforcement in this
manner be punished with compelled disclosure of the same potentially
damaging information to the company's civil adversaries? Traditional
waiver doctrine requires just such a punitive result.
Due to concerns over maintaining corporate cooperation with federal
investigations, the chair of the House Judiciary Committee asked the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules to consider a rule to protect
cooperating corporations from the harsh consequences of traditional waiver
doctrine. 8 In June 2006, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure approved for notice and comment proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 governing waiver of the attorney-client privilege and workproduct protection. 9 One provision of the proposed rule would have
allowed corporations that disclose privileged information to federal
government entities to maintain the corporation's attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection against the corporation's civil adversaries. 10
Due to the increasing pressure for corporations to cooperate with federal
regulators and law enforcement agencies, corporations have been fighting
for such "selective waiver" of privilege in the courts for over thirty years,

7. Id.
8. See Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y to the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Jan. 23,
2006) (on file with author) (requesting that the U.S. Judicial Conference "initiate a rulemaking on forfeiture of privileges").
9. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the
Federal
Rules
of Practice
and Procedure
(2006),
available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brochure_2006.pdf. Because rules of privilege cannot take
effect through the ordinary rule-making process without the approval of Congress and
because the rule would control state court determinations of waiver, it is "anticipated that
Congress must enact this rule directly." See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 5
[hereinafter May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf, see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000).
The Advisory Committee's May 15, 2006, report attached the draft of proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 502 and the draft Advisory Committee Note as an exhibit. See May 15, 2006,
Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra, at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at
1-11. The proposed rule would control state court waiver decisions regarding disclosures
originally made in a federal proceeding only. See id.; see also infra Part I.D and
accompanying notes.
10. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 2. Although the language of the proposed rule would
not have restricted this protection to "corporate" entities cooperating with the federal
government, the protection would almost always benefit such parties, as individuals are
rarely asked to cooperate by waiving the attorney-client or work-product privilege. See infra
Part II.A and accompanying notes.
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but with little success. 1 The doctrine has been almost uniformly rejected
by the federal courts that have visited the issue as inconsistent with bedrock

privilege principles. 12 As a result, companies that have turned over
privileged information generated in corporate internal investigations
conducted under the supervision of counsel to federal investigators have
been punished by having to provide their civil adversaries with the same
3
sensitive information.'
On the verge of obtaining the protection they have long sought through
this proposed evidence rule, corporate counsel did a surprising about-face
and formed a broad coalition opposing the proposal. 14 This coalition claims
that selective waiver would perpetuate and endorse a "culture of waiver"
that has evolved in connection with federal investigations.' 5 Such critics
fear that adoption of selective waiver protection would legitimize the
government's allegedly aggressive investigative policies that give rise to the
initial corporate disclosures, thus impeding the progress the corporate
defense bar has been making to derail those policies. 16 In the face of vocal
opposition to the proposal, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
found selective waiver to be essentially a political question and deleted the
selective waiver provision from the proposed rule sent to the Standing

11. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
12. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
13. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
14. See, e.g., Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege: The Negative Impactfor
Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American Legal System: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Coalition Submission] (statement
of the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege). Members of the Coalition
include the American Chemistry Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., the Business Roundtable,
the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id.
15. Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Corp.
Counsel, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
at
U.S.
(June
20,
2006),
available
Judicial
Conference
of
the
(opining that
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-002.pdf
adoption of proposed Rule 502 could "creat[e] a presumption on the part of the government
that it is appropriate to demand waiver in all circumstances"); see also Memo from William
McGuinness & Michael S. Russ, Chairs, Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, to Peter G. McCabe,
Sec'y, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
at
(Feb.
13,
2007),
available
U.S.
(expressing
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-052.pdf
concern that "selective waiver would advance the trend toward a 'culture of waiver' where
requests for waiver in return for charging credit will become all too common").
16. See, e.g., Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 209 (2007), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-Minutes-Transcript.pdf (testimony
of Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Association of Corporate Counsel)
("We need to take care of the underlying problems we have in the prosecutorial enforcement
community before we are able to deal with selective waiver in the government proceedings
aspects."); Mini-Hearingof the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 19 (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV Hearing-April_2006.pdf (testimony of David Brodsky,
ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege).
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Committee for approval.17 The committee did approve a report to Congress
on selective waiver, including draft language for federal legislation granting
cooperating corporations selective waiver protection.18 Therefore, selective
waiver has been kicked back to the legislature by the rule-making process
and awaits resolution there.
This Article voices a view on selective waiver protection that is contrary
to much of the current public discourse on the topic-that such protection
would represent a salutary change to waiver doctrine that would protect
cooperating corporations from the damaging effects of third-party waivers,
while at the same time serving the public interest in the effective oversight
of business entities. The Article examines the objections and fears raised
by critics of selective waiver and concludes that they largely rest upon the
unrealistic premise that federal law enforcement can and should operate in
the twenty-first century without seeking privileged and protected
information from corporate targets. The corporate disclosure of privileged
and protected information in cooperation with federal prosecutors and
regulators is a time-honored practice that will and should remain as the
legitimate legacy of the Enron era. In light of this reality, selective waiver
legislation would represent a valuable and overdue change in current waiver
doctrine for corporate clients that is consistent with the evolving and
flexible treatment of privilege waiver.
This Article discusses the need for selective waiver in three parts. Part I
explores the evolution of the current selective waiver controversy. It
examines the federal law enforcement policies that have developed over the
past three decades to combat corruption at the corporate level and captures
the heated political debate surrounding those policies and the "culture of
waiver" many claim they have fostered. In addition, Part I elucidates the
various government responses to the hue and cry over these policies. Part I
concludes by describing the federal courts' overwhelming refusal to provide
common law selective waiver protection to companies caught in the
crosshairs of such government policies that inevitably led to the selective
waiver provision drafted by the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.
17. See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, at Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 3 (2007) [hereinafter
May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2007.pdf.

Committee],

available at

18. Id. at Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 3-4. At its June 11on
Rules
of
the
Standing
Committee
12,
2007,
meeting,
Practice and Procedure approved the Advisory Committee recommendation on Federal Rule
of Evidence 502 and its report on selective waiver. See Press Release, Comm. on Rules of

Practice and Procedure, Standing Rules Committee Approved Proposed Rules and Forms
Amendments and New Rules; Approved Proposed Amendments and New Rules for
Publication

(June

2007),

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index2.html#standing0607.

available

at

Rather than sending the selective

waiver report directly to Congress with proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, the Standing

Committee elected to alert Congress to its existence in the cover letter on Rule 502 and to
make the selective waiver report available to Congress upon request. Id.
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Part II carefully analyzes the opposition to the current federal approach to
corporate targets and concludes that exchanging leniency for corporate
cooperation represents a legitimate prosecutorial technique that has long
been accepted in the context of individual prosecution. Part II further
explains that corporate waivers have become an indispensable part of the
fabric of federal corporate investigations which will and should continue to
play an important role in ensuring effective corporate oversight. Part II
discusses how selective waiver protection will provide an additional
incentive for companies to cooperate in this way by eliminating the
unnecessary collateral costs of cooperation on the civil side. Finally, Part II
emphasizes that selective waiver protection will not undermine the integrity
of internal corporate investigations and will, instead, give corporations
crucial control over the ultimate destination of the information provided to
federal entities.
Part III examines the compatibility of selective waiver protection with
modem privilege doctrine. It demonstrates that selective waiver fits into
the paradigmatic shift that has taken place in contemporary privilege and
waiver doctrine where rigid insistence on complete confidentiality has
gradually been replaced with considerations of fairness and party control
over information. In addition, Part III examines the statutory language
drafted by the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and suggests
drafting choices that will provide the most predictable and complete
protection possible for corporations currently caught between the "rock" of
federal investigation and the "hard place" of massive civil exposure.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SELECTIVE WAIVER

The current selective waiver controversy arises from the application of
federal law enforcement policies to corporate targets. While corporate
crime is not new, federal law enforcement has recently adopted an
increasingly aggressive approach to the investigation and prosecution of
wrongdoing in American corporations. 19 In order to keep markets and
19. In 2002, President George W. Bush created the "Corporate Fraud Task Force."
Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002). The Corporate Fraud Task

Force was designed to coordinate and oversee all corporate fraud matters being investigated
by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and to enhance the interagency coordination of
regulatory and criminal investigations. Id. In addition to establishing the Corporate Fraud
Task Force, the President asked that Congress provide the administration new tools to utilize
in the battle to enforce corporate responsibility and to eradicate corporate corruption. On
July 30, 1992, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). The
legislation modified existing enforcement of corporate responsibility in many ways. Among
other things, the act increased accountability of corporate officers and directors by requiring
them to personally certify financial reports submitted to the SEC and by criminalizing willful
certification of false financial reports, increased availability of corporate documents for use
in government investigations by mandating retention of such documents and by
criminalizing any alteration or falsification of such documents, created criminal culpability
for securities fraud with a twenty-five-year maximum term of imprisonment, prohibited the
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corporate stakeholders safe from the damaging effects of corporate
malfeasance, prosecutors have implemented policies designed to engage
business organizations as partners with federal law enforcement in
20
discovering, disclosing, and punishing individual corporate wrongdoers.
These policies generate disclosures of privileged corporate information to
government investigators which result in judicial findings of waiver. For
this reason, many commentators contend that the chief casualty of these
prosecutorial tactics is not the corporate
wrongdoer, but the attorney-client
21
privilege of good corporate citizens.
A. The Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion in
ChargingBusiness Organizations
Corporate entities in this country are subject to criminal liability for the
misconduct of individual officers and employees. 22 Corporations bear
broad responsibility for all of the illegal acts of their agents (a) committed
within the scope of the agents' employment and (b) intended to benefit the
corporation, at least in part. 23 Despite such a broad standard of liability that
sale of stock by corporate insiders during blackout periods, and criminalized retaliation
against corporate whistleblowers. Id.
20. See Memo from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-.memo.pdf ("[O]ur corporate charging
principles are not only familiar, but they are welcomed by most corporations in our country
because good corporate leadership shares many of our goals.").
21. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
22. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909) (adopting a respondeat superior theory of corporate liability for criminal misconduct
of its employees). Prior to the decision in New York Central, American courts had declined
to hold corporate entities accountable for criminal wrongdoing on the basis that corporations
were artificial entities incapable of forming the necessary mens rea. See Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate CriminalAccountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 Wash. U. L.Q.
393, 396, 413 (1982) (explaining that "[t]he corporation was recognized in law not as a
natural person, but as an artificial entity. As an abstraction, it lacked physical, mental, and
moral capacity to engage in wrongful conduct, or to suffer punishment. It could neither
commit criminal acts, entertain criminal intent, nor suffer imprisonment. It had no soul, and
so could not be blamed").
23. See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 (4th Cir.
1985); New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 493; United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42
(1st Cir. 1982). This rule of vicarious criminal culpability is "considerably broader than in
most other countries." V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should
Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1239, 1243 (2000); see
also Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrinefor Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability,
17 Managerial & Decision Econ. 381, 382 (1996) (explaining that "the United States
virtually stands alone in the world on its approach" to criminal responsibility for
corporations). In order to satisfy the "scope of employment" requirement for corporate
culpability, a corporate agent must be performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to
perform on behalf of the corporation in engaging in criminal wrongdoing. See Cincotta, 689
F.2d at 242 (upholding liability of a corporation where an employee passed money
associated with a fraudulent transaction through the corporate treasury as part of
employment duties). In addition, an agent need not act solely for the corporation's benefit in
committing the criminal act, so long as one motivation of the agent was to benefit the entity.
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permits prosecution of a corporate entity for almost any transgression by an
employee, prosecution of the corporate entity itself historically has been the
exception rather than the rule. 24
Prosecutors enjoy broad charging
discretion in this country and, in the federal system, prosecutors have
traditionally exercised this discretion to avoid indicting corporate entities

due to the potentially disastrous consequences for innocent corporate

stakeholders. 25 For many years, this traditional corporate exemption from

criminal liability encouraged and allowed corporate entities to engage in a
circle the wagons approach when faced with federal investigations,
aggressively defending employee misconduct, and making law enforcement
do its own costly and time-consuming legwork. 26 Until recently, that is.
After several high-profile scandals ravaged publicly traded American
corporations, federal prosecutors recognized that "sometimes, bringing
See United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (lst Cir. 2006) (using a test that requires
determining whether an agent's acts are motivated, at least in part, by an intent to benefit the
corporation); Cincotta, 689 F.2d at 242 (finding corporate culpability appropriate where a
company "was making money by selling oil that it had not paid for" despite the fact that the
agent was also motivated by self-interest); Memo from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y
Gen., to Dep't Component Heads & U.S. Att'ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations
(June
16,
1999)
[hereinafter
Holder
Memo],
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html
(noting
that
"[a]gents . . . may act for mixed reasons-both for self-aggrandizement (both direct and
indirect) and for the benefit of the corporation, and a corporation may be held liable as long
as one motivation of its agent is to benefit the corporation"). Further, no actual profit or
other benefit to the corporation is necessary to hold the entity accountable for the criminal
misconduct of its agents so long as the agent intended, at least in part, to benefit the entity.
See Automated Med. Lab., 770 F.2d at 407 (noting that "whether the agent's actions
ultimately redounded to the benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the
agent acted with the intent to benefit the corporation").
24. See Simons, supra note 2, at 986 (noting that vicarious organizational prosecution is
not applied as broadly as the standard permits and that "corporations-particularly large
public corporations-are prosecuted quite infrequently"). Simons cites 2001 sentencing data
for "white collar offenses" and notes the increase in organizational prosecutions from 1995
to 2001. Id.
25. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006)
[hereinafter McNulty Statement] (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice) ("Federal prosecutors could lawfully exercise their discretion to charge a
corporation in many instances where we have stayed our hand[] ... [b]ecause a corporation,
while legally a person, also represents a unique entity in which many have a stakeshareholders, employees and customers to name but three."); Philip Urofsky, Prosecuting
Corporations: The Federal Principles and Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. Att'ys'
Bull., Mar. 2002, at 19, 20 (stating that "[iun most cases, the liability of the corporation for
the acts of a corporate agent is not a matter of law but of prosecutorial discretion" and
emphasizing that "the fact that a corporation is technically subject to strict respondeat
superior for the acts of its employees, even if contrary to the corporation's policies and
interests, requires a prosecutor to examine carefully the equities of charging a corporation
under the specific circumstances presented by a particular case").
26. See McNulty Statement, supra note 25 (noting concerns raised by the "circling the
wagons" approach to corporate defense, which seeks to "prevent the communication of
truthful information from current and former employees to the government, in order to
protect either the employees or the corporation itself").
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criminal charges against a corporation is the only fair and effective way to
deal with a corporate culture that has been corrupted to the point that it
tolerates and even encourages criminal activity. '27 The indictment of
business organizations like Arthur Andersen served to increase law
enforcement leverage in corporate investigations
and improve the efficacy
28
and speed of government investigations.
While charging decisions historically have remained hidden from public
view, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) revealed the factors driving
corporate indictment decisions in a memorandum published in 1999 by
then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder entitled "Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations," also known as the "Holder Memo." 29 The
Holder Memo recognized some special considerations to be analyzed in
deciding whether to charge a corporation criminally in light of the unique
"nature of the corporate 'person."' 30 The memo listed eight factors to be
evaluated, including the nature and severity of the alleged misconduct, the
pervasiveness of wrongdoing throughout the entity, the history of similar
misconduct by the entity, and the compliance mechanisms in place
27. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hurr, Corporate CriminalProsecutionin a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095,
1099 (2006) (describing the philosophy of the memo issued by Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson); see also McNulty Memo, supra note 20 (emphasizing the important
massive deterrent effect of the corporate indictment).
28. In probably the most well-known recent example of criminal liability for a business
organization, the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, LLP, was indicted in March 2002 for
obstruction of justice. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005).
Although the firm's conviction was ultimately overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
indictment led to the demise of the firm, turning the Big Six in the accounting industry into
the Big Five. See Simons, supra note 2, at 1010-16 (detailing the demise of the accounting
firm and the massive document shredding that generated the obstruction charges). In another
recent example, prosecutors indicted Reliant Energy Services in April 2004 for fraudulent
trading practices during the 2000-01 California energy crisis. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Reliant Energy Services, Inc. and Four of Its Officers Charged with Criminal
Manipulation of California Electricity Market (Apr. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/April/04_crm_223.htm (explaining that the indictment
accused the company of intentionally driving up the price of electricity in California by
shutting off the company's power generators); see also McNulty Statement, supra note 25
(noting that the DOJ responded to corporate scandals with "vigor and action," obtaining
more than 1000 corporate fraud convictions since 2002).
29. Holder Memo, supra note 23.
Despite recognized dangers inherent in the
publication of factors governing prosecutorial discretion, commentators have noted the
benefits to be gained through such structuring of discretion. See Wayne R. LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 13.2, at 684 (4th ed. 2004) ("What is needed is for each prosecutor's
office to develop a statement of general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, particularizing such matters as the circumstances that properly can be considered
mitigating or aggravating."); see also McNulty Statement, supra note 25 (noting that the
charging memo promoted "transparency in the one area that a prosecutor can exercise the
most individual choice and judgment-the charging process").
30. Holder Memo, supra note 23, at 3. The memo provided that these considerations
were designed to offer guidance to individual prosecutors in determining whether corporate
indictment was appropriate and were not intended to mandate the outcome in any given case.
See id. at 4.

2007]

PROPOSED SELECTIVE WAIVER LEGISLATION

139

internally to detect and prevent such misconduct. 3 1 The memo also
emphasized the importance of corporate cooperation with the government
investigation as a mitigating factor, directing prosecutors to consider "[t]he
corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work-product
privileges. ' 32 The memo explained the potential importance of corporate
privilege and work-product waivers in giving the government access to
corporate internal investigation materials and communications between
corporate directors, officers, employees, and counsel as follows: "Such
waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or
immunity agreements. In addition, they are often critical in enabling the
government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation's voluntary
'3 3
disclosure and cooperation.
The memo provided that such waivers should ordinarily be limited to
factual internal investigation and contemporaneous advice to the
corporation and should not include waivers of information concerning the
criminal investigation, except in "unusual circumstances." 34 The memo
explicitly stated that waiver of the attorney-client and work-product
protections was not required to avoid indictment or to be considered
cooperative and that such waivers should be used as only one possible
35
factor in evaluating the ultimate charging decision.

31. See id. at 3-4.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 7 n.2.
35. Id. at 7; see also Urofsky, supra note 25, at 22 (noting that "the Principles do not
require, or even encourage, a prosecutor to seek a waiver in all circumstances, and they make
it absolutely clear that such waivers are not absolute requirements for cooperation").
Although the Holder Memo represented the first official appearance of privilege waiver as a
factor affecting DOJ charging decisions, favorable treatment by government investigators in
exchange for voluntary corporate disclosures was nothing new in 1999. The SEC launched
its voluntary disclosure program in the mid-1970s-more than two decades prior to the
Holder Memo. Due to insufficient investigative resources to devote to concerns of political
"slush fund" practices and bribery of foreign officials by several corporations, the SEC
developed the program to encourage companies to appoint special committees advised by
outside counsel to investigate the corporation's practices and to share their results with the
commission. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 295 n.7 (6th Cir. 2002). The SEC currently includes a company's willingness to
provide information, including some privileged information, as one criterion for evaluating
corporate cooperation, noting that the purpose of such a waiver is solely to provide critical
information to the commission: "In this regard, the Commission does not view a company's
waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to provide
relevant and sometimes critical information to the Commission staff." Report of
Investigation and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
Seaboard Report], availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/_investreport/34-44969.htm.
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In the years immediately following the release of the Holder Memo,
federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies intensified their focus on
corporate fraud as a result of several high profile scandals involving
36
publicly traded companies, including Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom.
As a result of these scandals and the extensive public harm they caused, the
executive branch made investigation and prosecution of corporate fraud a
top priority. 3 7 To further the effective prosecution of corporate fraud, thenDeputy Attorney General Larry Thompson released a revised set of
corporate charging principles on January 20, 2003, also known as the
"Thompson Memo." 38
The Thompson Memo emphasized the twin
considerations most important in a corporate charging decision: (1)
"authentic" corporate cooperation with the government and (2) effective
corporate compliance programs designed to bring corporate malfeasance to
light. 39 In describing "authentic" corporate cooperation, the Thompson
Memo noted concerns over corporate targets paying lip service to the
concept of cooperation, while at the same time acting to impede the
government investigation by counseling employees to withhold
information. 40 The memo cautioned that such conduct by a corporation
36. See Buchanan, supra note 3 (noting that "the subject of organizational accountability
has been brought to the fore by a series of high-profile corporate scandals that have shaken
the public's confidence in the way that some of our largest companies conduct business").
Although these corporate scandals sparked heightened concern over market stability and
investor confidence, crime in the organizational context was not new. See Simons, supra
note 2, at 999-1008 (discussing Boesky insider trading scandal and other corporate
investigations of the 1980s and 1990s).
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
38. Memo from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components &
U.S. Att'ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter
Thompson
Memo],
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm;
see
also
DOJ Revises
Memorandum on Principlesfor Prosecution of Business Organizations, 72 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 468 (2003).
39. See Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at 1 (noting "increased emphasis on and
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation" and "the efficacy of the corporate
governance mechanisms in place within a corporation"). Companies cooperate with federal
investigations in a number of ways depending upon the issues raised, including by (1)
making witnesses available for prosecutors to interview without subpoenas, (2) replacing
managers accountable for underlying wrongdoing, (3) terminating employees who refuse to
cooperate with the investigation, (4) sharing interview memos and other internal
investigation materials, (5) directing professionals retained by the company to meet with
prosecutors and share working papers, and (6) postponing or adjusting internal investigations
to meet the government's needs. See Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1136. The Thompson
Memo also added an instruction to prosecutors to consider alternative resolutions to
corporate criminality through the use of pretrial diversion mechanisms traditionally applied
against juvenile and drug offenders. See id. at 1103. This drastically increased the use of
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporate entities. See id. at 1135.
Such agreements serve to place the company on a probation of sorts while monitors and
other creative measures are employed to improve corporate compliance. Id. at 1104.
40. See Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at 6 (explaining that "[alnother factor to be
weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has
engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation .... Examples of such conduct include:
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Although the

memo discussed the importance of cooperation in this respect, the
Thompson revision did not alter the department position with respect to

corporate privilege waivers, maintaining their status as only one non42
mandatory factor in evaluating corporate cooperation.
Although the Thompson Memo has drawn the most vocal criticism from
the corporate bar, the DOJ is not the only federal department to place a
premium on corporate cooperation with government investigations and to
count waiver of privileges as one method of cooperation. Indeed, the

department's charging policy constitutes "the Justice Department's embrace
of a distinct philosophy of corporate enforcement that has steadily gained
favor throughout the government. ' 43
The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and others have similar

overly broad assertions of corporate representation of employees or former employees;
inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate
openly and fully with the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline to be
interviewed; making presentations or submissions that contain misleading assertions or
omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and failure to promptly disclose
illegal conduct known to the corporation"). The other change in the Thompson Memo
related to the evaluation of a corporation's existing compliance program to help prosecutors
determine whether a program provided meaningful and effective oversight or whether it was
merely a "paper program." Id. at 7. Relying upon the decision of the Delaware Chancery
Court in In re Caremark International,Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996), the revision provided prosecutors with several factors to assist in evaluating corporate
compliance programs. See Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at 7 (including whether a
corporation's directors exercise independent review over proposed corporate actions rather
than unquestioningly ratifying officers' recommendations, whether directors are provided
with information sufficient to enable the exercise of independent judgment, whether internal
audit functions are conducted at a level sufficient to ensure their independence and accuracy,
and whether directors have established reasonable information gathering and reporting
systems within the organization). The Thompson Memo also added an eighth factor to be
considered in evaluating organizational prosecution: "the adequacy of the prosecution of
individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance." Id. at 3.
41. See Thompson Memo, supra note 38.
42. A comparison of the two memoranda suggests one minor change in the language
regarding waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Where the Holder Memo stated that the
waiver by the corporation would be considered as "only one factor" in evaluating the
corporation's cooperation, the Thompson Memo deleted the modifier "only" and provided
that waiver would be considered as "one factor" in evaluating corporate cooperation. There
is no other suggestion in the memo that the deletion of this modifier was intended to increase
the importance of waiver as a factor in assessing cooperation, although one could certainly
argue that the deletion of the word "only" accomplishes just that. Compare Holder Memo,
supra note 23, at 7, with Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at 5. The emphasis on gauging
the "authenticity" of a corporation's cooperation may also explain why the Thompson Memo
has been interpreted as more encouraging of waivers than the Holder Memo. See Wray &
Hurr, supra note 27, at 1175.
43. Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1107-08.
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cooperation policies that contemplate the sharing of protected information

by corporate entities. 44
B. The "Sound and Fury' 45 Regarding Corporate Waivers
of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The relationship between an attorney and his client historically has
enjoyed privileged status. 46 Although a lawyer's code of ethics has long
demanded confidentiality
of client communications,
the modem

justification for the evidentiary privilege stems from the instrumental goal
of encouraging parties to seek effective legal counsel to govern their affairs
in a complex society of laws. 47 The application of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of an individual client who is a natural person can

raise many interpretative problems, but when the "client" to be protected by

44. See, e.g., Seaboard Report, supra note 35; see also Lance Cole, Revoking Our
Privileges: FederalLaw Enforcement's Multi-front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege
(And Why It Is Misguided), 48 Vill. L. Rev. 469 (2003); Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at
1107-33 (discussing in detail the various policies in place across the federal government to
encourage cooperative partnership between the federal government and those business
organizations and industries it regulates). Indeed, some of the policies adopted by other
agencies place an even greater emphasis on waiver than does the DOJ policy. For example,
an enforcement advisory issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission creates a
greater expectation for waiver, asking, "Did the company willingly waive corporate
attorney-client and work product protection for internal investigation reports and other
corporate documents?
[Or] waive corporate attorney-client privilege for employee
testimony?"
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., Enforcement
Advisory: Cooperation Factors in Enforcement Division Sanction Recommendations 2
(n.d.), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/enf/enfcooperation-advisory.pdf.
45. James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks Before the American Bar Association
14th Annual Institute on Health Care Fraud (May 13, 2004), in U.S. Att'ys' Bull., Sept.
2005, at 1, 3 (noting the "sound and fury" generated by the DOJ corporate charging policy).
46. See Note, Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1450, 1457-58 (1985).
47. See Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 72.1, at 131 (Thomson West
6th ed. 2006); C.B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 5.8 (2d ed. 1999); 8 John
Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2291 (3d ed. 1940); see also In re Colton, 201 F.
Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (explaining that "[i]n the eighteenth century, when the desire
for truth overcame the wish to protect the honor of witnesses and several testimonial
privileges disappeared, the attorney-client privilege was retained, on the new theory that it
was necessary to encourage clients to make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to
enable the latter properly to advise the clients. This is the basis of the privilege today"),
aff'd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1962). Due to the traditional
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, privilege doctrine is not its only protector. An
attorney's ethical obligations provide even broader protection to the client than does
privilege doctrine. The American Bar Association (ABA) Rules of Professional Conduct
forbid a lawyer to disclose confidential client communications even outside the context of
legal proceedings where the attorney-client privilege applies. See Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.6(a) (2003) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent."). Where a lawyer's
ethical obligations are broader than the protection of the evidentiary privilege, however, a
lawyer may be compelled to testify despite the demands of his ethical code of conduct. As a
result, most ethical rules allow for disclosure compelled by court order. See id. R. 1.6(b)(6).

2007]

PROPOSEDSELECTIVE WAIVER LEGISLATION

143

the privilege is a corporate entity that derives its very existence from the
law and is operated only through the joint efforts of a group of individuals
acting on its behalf, the difficulties in applying privilege doctrine become
even more complex. 48 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has long

recognized that a corporate entity is entitled to the protection of the
attorney-client privilege when its officers and employees seek legal advice
on behalf of the company. 49 Likewise, a corporation's adversaries may not
compel production of the work-product material of corporate counsel
50
prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Because the DOJ policy evaluates a potential target's cooperation, in
part, through its willingness to waive the historically sacred protection of
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, it has proven to
be a source of persistent controversy. Both the Holder and Thompson
5
memos sent shock waves through the corporate legal community. '

Although the stated policy regarding privilege waivers did not change
substantively with the Thompson Memo, the outcry intensified after the
2003 revision. 52 A number of vocal critics have argued that the policy has
48. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) ("Admittedly
complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, which
in theory is an artificial creature of the law ....).
49. Id. at 390-92; see also United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S.
318, 336 (1915) (assuming that the attorney-client privilege protects a corporate entity in its
efforts to seek legal advice).
50. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-98. While the attorney-client privilege protects only the
confidential communications between a client and his attorney, the work-product doctrine
provides additional protection for the work product of an attorney made in anticipation of
litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(2)(a). In recognizing the work-product doctrine, the Supreme Court
noted the need for a lawyer to "work with a certain degree of privacy." Hickman, 329 U.S. at
510. As with attorney-client privilege, the Court adopted a partly instrumental justification
for protecting attorney work product. The Court noted the importance of competent legal
representation to society as a whole and expressed concern that counsel would decline to
record work product in an effort to conceal it from his adversary in the absence of any
protection from disclosure, which would result in inefficiency and less competent
representation. Id. at 511 ("Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served."). Further, the Court found
overtones of "unfairness" in allowing an adversary to free ride off of the strategic efforts of
his opponent. Id. at 516.
51. See, e.g., Conference Report on 15th Annual National Institute on White Collar
Crime: DOJGuidelines on Corporate Waivers of Attorney Client Privilege Draws Criticism,
68 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 563 (2001); Tamara Loomis, Privilege Waivers: ProsecutorsStep
Up Use of Bargaining Chips, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 2000, at 5; Breckinridge L. Willcox,
Attorney/Client Privilege Waivers: Wrongheaded Practice?,6 Bus. Crimes Bull., Jan. 2000,
at 1; Letter on Behalf of Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n to Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't
of Justice (May 12, 2000), availableat http://www.acc.com/public/accpolicy/holder.html.
52. Criticisms of DOJ policy did not begin with the Thompson Memo. The Holder
Memo was criticized as "a requiem marking the death of privilege in corporate criminal
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been applied more frequently and more aggressively since the Thompson
Memo, making waiver requests routine and resulting in a "culture of
waiver" in federal organizational prosecutions and investigations. 53 The
investigations." David M. Zomow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World:
The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 147,
147-48 (2000). Since the Thompson Memo, the outrage over the policy has only grown.
The ABA, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
Association of Corporate Counsel, and the American Civil Liberties Union have been among
the most vocal critics of the policy. See Coalition Submission, supra note 14; see also Am.
Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Doctrine in FederalCriminalInvestigations, 41 Duq. L. Rev. 307 (2003). In 2004, the ABA
created a task force dealing solely with the issue of corporate waiver of attomey-client
privilege and issued a report criticizing the DOJ charging policy. ABA Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 Bus. Law. 1029 (2005). In 2006, several former high-ranking
DOJ officials sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales objecting to the Thompson
Memo's treatment of waiver, stating that it was "seriously flawed." See Letter from Griffin
B. Bell, Former Att'y Gen. (1977-79) et al., to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., Dep't of
Justice (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Former DOJ Officials' Letter], available at
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/agsept52006.pdf, see also Richard Ben-Veniste &
Lee H. Rubin, DOJReaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines,
Legal
Backgrounder,
Apr.
4,
2003,
at
4,
available
at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/040403LBBenveniste.pdf (expressing concern over corporate
privilege waivers that precede internal corporate investigations, but conceding that corporate
privilege waivers following internal investigations may be appropriate and reasonable);
Cole, supra note 44. Corporate privilege waivers have also created concern in Congress. See
White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). See generally The Thompson Memo's Effect on the Right to
Counsel in CorporateInvestigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) [hereinafter September 12, 2006, Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing]. Although
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in connection with corporate fraud investigations
has drawn the most public criticism, other aspects of the charging policy have also come
under fire. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra, at 324-39 (expressing concern over
government suspicion of joint-defense agreements and disincentives to front attorneys' fees);
Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra, at 4 (lamenting that the policy discourages joint-defense
agreements and punishes "overly broad" assertions of employee representation). Indeed, a
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently found that government
pressure under the policy to deny payment of legal fees for individual targets of the
government investigation was unconstitutional. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). In addition to the attacks on the DOJ policy, the ABA and others opposed
certain language in Application Note 12 to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C2.5 because it
conditioned credit for cooperation at sentencing, in part, upon privilege waiver. ABA Task
Force
on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, Task
Force Mission
Statement,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2007). In response to the
criticism, the Sentencing Commission deleted the language complained of, effective
November 1, 2006, because "the sentence at issue could be misinterpreted to encourage
waivers." Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,063, 28,073 (May
15, 2006).
53. See ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 52 (discussing
"culture of waiver"). The existing survey data regarding the frequency of corporate waivers
of attorney-client and work-product protections is in conflict. According to an ABA survey
of over 1200 corporate counsel, almost seventy-five percent of respondents believe that
waiver requests are routine. See Am. Chemistry Council et al., The Decline of the AttorneyClient Privilege in the Corporate Context Survey Results 3 (2006), available at
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focus on authentic corporate cooperation and compliance has undoubtedly
altered the manner in which companies respond to alleged wrongdoing
within their ranks and has resulted in increased cooperation with the
government and attention to internal compliance programs. 54 The critics of
the policy contend that it goes too far, however, and that it creates a "culture
of waiver" that has numerous deleterious effects on effective and fair
representation of corporations and on law enforcement's ultimate goal of
eradicating corporate fraud.
First, critics of the policy argue that government requests for waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection represent an
inappropriate intrusion into the sanctity of the time-honored lawyer-client
relationship that is inherently unfair. Several groups suggest that corporate
clients are unable to resist the pressure for waivers from the behemoth
power that is the DOJ, making waivers by cooperating companies coerced
and involuntary. 55 Furthermore, critics complain that the very policy
designed to encourage good corporate citizenship ultimately will decrease
corporate oversight and compliance inconsistent with legitimate law
enforcement and public interests. 56 Specifically, critics argue that routine
waivers of corporate protections will discourage individual employees from
sharing information with corporate counsel crucial to the exposure of
corporate criminal wrongdoing. 57
These groups contend that the
government policies drive a damaging wedge between corporate counsel
and individual employees who must work jointly to ensure the healthy
operation of a business entity. Critics also express concern that corporate
counsel will reduce oversight activities and will refrain from documenting
the results of any internal investigations that are performed for fear of
eventual exposure to government officials. 58 Finally, critics complain about
the punitive consequences visited upon cooperating corporations when their
protected information is turned over to their adversaries in later civil

http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf. In 2002, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines conducted a survey to
ascertain the frequency of assistant U.S. attorney requests for waivers from organizational
defendants. See Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational
Sentencing
Guidelines
98
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG-Final.pdf. This survey suggested infrequent waiver
requests by prosecutors. Id.; see also In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1199
(10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the commentary decrying a "culture of waiver," but finding
the existence of such a culture not supported by the record. "Aside from the anecdotal
material serving as the foundation for the purported 'culture of waiver,' the record is silent
regarding its existence, significance, and longevity"); Buchanan, supra note 3, at 597-98
(discussing the survey results).
54. Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1097, 1149.
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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litigation. 59 The American Bar Association (ABA) and other groups have
urged the DOJ to abandon its policy of using waivers as a part of corporate

cooperation altogether and have suggested a revision to the department's
policy that flatly forbids consideration of waiver in evaluating corporate
60
cooperation.
The frequent and highly publicized attacks on the federal cooperation
policy have captured the attention of the senior leadership within the DOJ,
as well as members of Congress. The result has been a delicate dance
designed to address the mounting concerns of the corporate defense bar
without compromising department goals with respect to criminal

enforcement in the corporate arena. With the controversy over corporate
privilege waiver at a fever pitch, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 on December 7, 2006.61
Consistent with the ABA proposal, the legislation would prohibit

government lawyers from considering waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection in assessing cooperation in connection
62

with any federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter.
Then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty responded on December
12, 2006, by superseding the long-criticized Thompson Memo with yet
another revision to the DOJ charging policy, also known as the "McNulty
Memo." 63 The McNulty Memo stood firm on the importance of corporate
59. See, e.g., Former DOJ Officials' Letter, supra note 52, at 2 (expressing concern over
"follow-on" civil litigation where "sensitive-and sometimes confidential-information"
disclosed to the government can be "used against the entities in class action, derivative, and
similar suits, to the detriment of the entity's employees and shareholders").
60. See John Gibeaut, Hearings Target Thompson Memo: Former Prosecutors,
Defenders CriticizePolicy on Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege, ABA J. & Rep., Sept. 15,
2006 (on file with author) (listing proposed changes to the existing DOJ charging policy,
including "[e]limination of waiver and payment of employee legal fees as considerations
when deciding whether to charge a company"); see also September 12, 2006, Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearing,supra note 52, at 123 (testimony of Edwin Meese III, Ronald
Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Pub. Policy, Chairman, Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies,
The Heritage Found.).
61. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2006). The bill was reintroduced in the 110th Congress and awaits action. Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2007).
62. See supra note 61. The bill is not solely concerned with privilege waivers, but also
prohibits government consideration of a company's decision to pay the attorneys' fees of an
employee under investigation, to enter into a joint-defense agreement with an employee, or
to refuse to terminate a person's employment for lack of cooperation. See id. The bill largely
adopts the recommendations of the ABA in connection with the DOJ charging policies. See
id.
63. McNulty Memo, supra note 20. This was not the DOJ's first attempt to allay
concerns over the corporate charging policy. On October 21, 2005, then-Acting Deputy
Attorney General Robert D. McCallum, Jr., issued a memo entitled "Waiver of Corporate
Attorney-Client and Work-Product Protection." Memo from Robert McCallum, Acting
Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys
(Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter McCallum Memo] (on file with author), While the McCallum
Memo did not change DOJ policy regarding corporate cooperation, it directed each federal
district and component to establish a "written waiver review process" to help ensure that
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cooperation with government investigations and maintained that privilege
and work-product waivers can be important tools in corporate prosecutions.
It sought to allay concerns about overly aggressive prosecutorial demands

for privilege waivers, however, by requiring a "legitimate need" for
privileged corporate information and the "least intrusive waiver necessary
to conduct a complete and thorough investigation. '64 The revision also
required consultation with Main Justice and approval by the United States

Attorney prior to a prosecutor's

request

for privileged

corporate

information. 6 5 Thus, while the revised charging criteria impose a stringent
standard on prosecutors seeking to request waivers and add some
procedural hurdles to overcome, they continue to utilize privilege waiver as

a potential avenue of corporate cooperation. The harshest critics of the DOJ
charging policy have declared the McNulty Memo to be "but a modest
improvement," finding that the new policy "fall[s] far short of what is
needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorney-client privilege,
"federal prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial discretion under the principles of the
Thompson Memorandum." Id. The memo provided that the written waiver-review processes
could vary from district to district to protect the prosecutorial discretion of each component
head to conduct investigations and seek cooperation of business organizations effectively. Id.
The ABA and other opponents of the policy accused the McCallum Memo of exacerbating
the existing problem for corporate clients by allowing and even encouraging "numerous
different waiver policies throughout the country." Letter from Michael S. Greco, President,
Am. Bar Ass'n, to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 2 (May 2, 2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060502letter-acprivgonz.pdf.
64. McNulty Memo, supra note 20, at 8, 9. The memo outlines a balancing test to be
used in determining the existence of a "legitimate need" for protected information, including
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the
government's investigation; (2) whether the information sought can be obtained in
a timely and complete fashion by using alternate means that do not require waiver;
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and (4) the
collateral consequences to a corporation of waiver.
Id. at 9. In addition, the memo created a "step-by-step approach" to department requests for
privileged information, dividing corporate information into "Category I" and "Category II"
information. Id.
The memo describes "Category I" information as "purely factual
information, which may or may not be privileged, relating to the underlying misconduct"
such as interview memos, organizational charts created by corporate counsel, factual
chronologies, factual summaries, or reports containing investigative facts documented by
counsel. Id. "Category I" information should be requested first if there is a legitimate need
for it. Id. Only in "rare circumstances should prosecutors seek 'Category II' information,
including attorney notes, memo[s] or reports containing counsel's mental impressions and
conclusions, legal determinations reached as a result of internal investigations, or legal
advice given to the corporation." Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 10-11. The U.S. attorney must consult with the assistant attorney general for
the criminal division prior to granting or denying a prosecutor's request to seek "Category I"
information, while the U.S. attorney must receive written authorization from the deputy
attorney general prior to approving a request for "Category II" information. Interestingly,
the memo further provides that a corporate refusal to provide "Category II" information shall
not be held against a corporation in the charging decision, but that prosecutors "may always
favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence." Id. at 10. The revised policy requires no
specialized showing or prior authorization for a company's voluntary disclosure of protected
information in the absence of any government request. Id. at 11. Voluntary waivers must be
reported, however, to the U.S. attorney and maintained in the office files. Id.
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work product and
employee protections
during
government
investigations." 66 These groups continue to push for legislation like the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act that would eliminate
government
67
cooperation policies that include privilege waivers altogether.
While many of the asserted deleterious collateral consequences of the
government policy are difficult to document other than anecdotally, 68 the
most readily identifiable victim of the cooperation policy to date has been
the corporation's privilege protection in civil litigation. As government
pressure to share information has intensified in recent years, corporate
targets have repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought to prevent waivers to
third parties following government disclosures in both federal and state
courts.

69

C. JudicialRejection of Selective Waiver Protection
Many corporate defendants have argued that their voluntary disclosure of
privileged information in cooperation with federal government
investigations should not constitute a waiver in related civil litigation.
However, the circuit courts that have addressed such selective waiver have
almost unanimously rejected it, leaving cooperating corporate defendants
exposed to increased liability as a result of their disclosures to the
government. 70 Most federal circuits have held that a party may not
66. Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, ABA J. eReport,
Dec.
15,
2006,
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/common/print/printview.cfln?Ref=http://www.abanet.org/jour
nal/ereport/Dl2Sepecter.html (quoting ABA President Karen J. Mathis). The ABA
continues to urge passage of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, which is
basically an echo of the ABA position on the issue. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 53.
69. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
70. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (refusing
to vacate district court order compelling production of 220,000 pages of privileged company
documents to civil class action plaintiffs based upon Qwest's prior disclosure to the DOJ and
SEC); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th
Cir. 2003) (stating that "after due consideration, we reject the concept of selective waiver, in
any of its various forms"); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir.
1997) (declining to adopt any form of protection for a party "who chooses to disclose a
privileged document to a third party"); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 233-34
(2d Cir. 1993) (reaffirming rejection of selective waiver); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Republic of Philippines., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425-26 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); In re Martin
Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The Fourth Circuit has not embraced
the concept of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege."); Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a corporate defendant had
"destroyed the confidential status of the ... attorney-client communications by permitting
their disclosure to the SEC staff' and stating that the concept of selective waiver was
"wholly unpersuasive"). Although the majority of cases addressing selective waiver have
declined to apply the doctrine, the circumstances and rationales present in the cases have
varied, leading one court to note that "the case law addressing the issue of limited waiver [is]
in a state of 'hopeless confusion."' In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 294-95 (quoting In re
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selectively waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection

under any circumstances and that disclosure to government agencies

destroys the privilege for all purposes. 7 1 A few circuits have held that the

existence of a confidentiality agreement between the government and the
72
disclosing party may prevent a total waiver under some circumstances.
Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has allowed a
business entity to disclose privileged information to government
and
investigators voluntarily without any promise of confidentiality
73
maintain privilege protection against a third-party litigant.
During the heart of the overseas corporate bribery scandal of the 1970s,
the Eighth Circuit permitted such a selective waiver in Diversified
Industries v. Meredith.74 Diversified Industries was sued by a customer
arising out of allegations that it maintained a slush fund to bribe customers'
purchasing agents. 75 The plaintiff sought production of reports and memos
prepared by Diversified's outside counsel in connection with an internal
investigation of the slush fund allegations. 76 Diversified opposed discovery
of the reports on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, but plaintiffs argued that Diversified had waived privilege by
voluntarily disclosing counsels' reports to the SEC in connection with its
77
investigation of Diversified.
The court refused to find a waiver of the privilege based upon
Diversified's disclosures to the SEC, emphasizing the benefits of corporate
self-analysis through counsel. 78 The court reasoned that a waiver for all
M&L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
73. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 607.
76. Id. at 599. Plaintiffs also sought production of certain minutes of meetings of
Diversified's board of directors. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 611. Although the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc could not agree that the
reports from the outside counsel had the protection of privilege in the first place, all of the
judges concurred in finding that Diversified's production of the reports to the SEC would not
constitute a waiver in the instant litigation if the reports were privileged prior to that
disclosure. Id. at 611-12 (Henley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with
the majority of the court that ... the privileges claimed by Diversified, if originally extant,
were not waived by the voluntary disclosures made by Diversified to the [SEC]."). Although
adopting selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege for disclosures to the SEC, a later
panel of the Eighth Circuit rejected the notion of selective waiver of the work-product
doctrine in In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844,
846 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Chrysler waived any work-product protection by voluntarily disclosing
the computer tape to its adversaries, the class action plaintiffs, during the due diligence phase
of the settlement negotiations."). The initial In re Chrysler disclosures that led to the waiver
were very different from those made in Diversified and the other selective waiver cases
because they were made to an adversary in civil litigation and not to a government agency in
cooperation with an investigation. Id. Further, it was the government seeking the benefit of
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purposes after disclosure to a government agency could "thwart[] the

developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders and customers." 79 The court also noted that the
disclosure to the SEC occurred in a "separate and nonpublic"
Although corporations have been advocating for
investigation. 80
Eighth
Circuit's selective waiver doctrine since 1977,
acceptance of the
only a few federal district courts have followed suit. 8 1 More recently, the
Delaware Chancery Court has accepted the doctrine of corporate selective
82
waiver to government entities as the "more prudent policy."
While a few federal decisions have expressed willingness to consider
allowing selective waiver where corporate privilege holders execute
appropriate confidentiality agreements with the government, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits have rejected the notion of selective waiver under any
circumstances. 83 These courts have found selective waiver inconsistent
the waiver after disclosure in In re Chrysler, thus furthering effective corporate law
enforcement. Id.
79. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
80. Id. This focus on the separate and nonpublic nature of the prior disclosure suggests
that the absence of any harm to Diversified's adversary in the instant litigation from the
protection of the privileged information drove the court's decision, at least in part. In a prior
panel opinion in this case, Judge Gerald Heaney, who drafted the en banc opinion, wrote a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. In that opinion, Judge Heaney
discussed the lack of waiver from the disclosure to the SEC, focusing on the fact that the
alleged waiver had not occurred in the litigation with the party now seeking the privileged
information. Id. at 604-05.
81. See Enron Corp. v. Borget, No. 88 CIV. 2828 (DNE), 1990 WL 144879, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990) ("[T]he public policy concern of encouraging cooperation with
law enforcement militates in favor of a no waiver finding."); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 605 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("LTV's disclosure of the additional materials to the SEC
does not justify the class' discovery of the identity of those documents believed by LTV to
be most important."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373
(E.D. Wis. 1979) ("I believe that such cooperation should be encouraged, and therefore I will
not treat the release of [counsel's] report to the Securities & Exchange Commission, Internal
Revenue Service, or the New York grand jury as a waiver of the corporation's attorneyclient privilege ..... ).
82. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 13, 2002) (holding that disclosure to SEC pursuant to confidentiality agreement did
not constitute waiver of work-product protection).
83. See supra note 70. Although most federal courts have rejected the concept of
selective waiver to government agencies regardless of the existence of a confidentiality
agreement, a few have indicated that the negotiation of a pre-disclosure confidentiality
agreement could protect the holder against production to third parties. In Teachers
Insurance & Annuity Ass 'n of America v. Shamrock BroadcastingCo., a district court held
that a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs upon disclosure to a federal
agency "only if the documents were produced without reservation; no waiver if the
documents were produced to the SEC under a protective order, stipulation or other express
reservation of the producing party's claim of privilege as to the material disclosed." 521 F.
Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y 1981); see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d
Cir. 1993) (finding a waiver of work-product protection due to disclosures of documents to
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with established privilege doctrine because it encourages the sharing of

protected information with the government, but in no way serves the
fundamental goal of the privilege to foster communications between
corporate counsel and the client. 84 These courts have found that the
purposeful breach of confidentiality to a potential adversary implicated by

cooperative disclosures to the government is inconsistent with traditional
privilege doctrine's insistence on jealous protection of attorney-client
communications. 85 According to these courts, the attorney-client privilege
86
should be available only at the traditional price-complete confidentiality.

Some courts have expressed concerns regarding the fairness of selective
disclosure to some parties but not others, emphasizing that the privilege is

to be used as a shield but not as a sword bent to the strategic goals of the
holder. 87 Many opinions have also questioned the need for a doctrine of
selective waiver to encourage cooperation with law enforcement in light of
the number of companies that voluntarily disclose protected information to
88
the government without any guarantee of protection.
Most recently, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have issued comprehensive
opinions rejecting selective waiver of privileged information to government
entities. 8 9 In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation, a panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected a corporation's attempt to
shield privileged documents from a civil adversary following production of
the SEC, but declining to adopt a rigid per se rule of waiver as failing to "anticipate
situations . . . in which the SEC and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit
agreement that the SEC will maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed materials").
84. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006); In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002);
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (3d Cir. 1991); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Republic of Philippines., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
85. See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1222. Furthermore, courts have classified the
government as a cooperating corporation's "adversary," thus finding a waiver of workproduct protection through voluntary disclosure to government authorities. See, e.g., In re
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
86. Permian,665 F.2d at 1222.
87. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303-04; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. But see
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 (stating that rejection of selective waiver did not depend
upon the "fairness doctrine" discussed by the Permian court).
88. See In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193 ("The record.., does not support the contention
that companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent protection under the
selective waiver doctrine. Most telling is Qwest's disclosure of 220,000 pages of protected
materials knowing the Securities case was pending, in the face of almost unanimous circuitcourt rejection of selective waiver in similar circumstances, and despite the absence of Tenth
Circuit precedent."); In re Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236 ("The SEC has continued to
receive voluntary cooperation from subjects of investigation, notwithstanding the rejection
of the selective waiver doctrine by two circuits and public statements from Directors of the
Enforcement Division that the SEC considers voluntary disclosures to be discoverable and
admissible."); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 ("[W]e do not think that a new privilege is
necessary to encourage voluntary cooperation with government investigations.... We find it
significant that Westinghouse chose to cooperate despite the absence of an established
privileged [sic] protecting disclosures to government agencies.").
89. See In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192; In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302.

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 76

the materials to the DOJ pursuant to "stringent confidentiality
provisions." 90 The court cited many of the traditional reasons used to reject
selective waiver. 9 1 In addition, the court perceived no justification for
singling out government actors for increased access to information and
expressed a preference for the "bright line" rule of complete waiver upon
voluntary disclosure to any third-party over a selective waiver rule, which
would involve the courts in "a new set of difficult'92line-drawing exercises
that would consume time and increase uncertainty.
Judge Danny Julian Boggs dissented and made a compelling case for
selective waiver to government entities. 93 Judge Boggs found no need to tie
selective waiver to the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege:
"It is not clear why an exception to the third-party waiver rule need be
moored to the justifications of the attorney-client privilege. ' 94 Rather,
90. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 292. The panel opinion in In re Columbia/HCA
was penned by the Honorable Thomas B. Russell, a district court judge sitting with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by designation. Because Judge Danny Julian Boggs
dissented from the opinion, only one sitting member of the Sixth Circuit officially endorsed
the opinion. Id. at 291. The confidentiality provisions agreed to by Columbia/HCA and the
DOJ provided in pertinent part that
[t]he disclosure of any report, document, or information by one party to the other
does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or claim under the workproduct doctrine. Both parties-to the agreement reserve the right to contest the
assertion of any privilege by the other party to the agreement, but will not argue
that the disclosing party, by virtue of the disclosures it makes pursuant to this
agreement, has waived any applicable privilege or work-product doctrine claim.
Id. at 292.
91. See id. at 302-03.
92. Id. at 304. The majority saw no need to encourage disclosures to the government
where it could obtain the information through its own investigatory powers. Id. at 303
(stating that "[g]overnmental agencies 'have means to secure the information they need'
other than through voluntary cooperation achieved via selective waiver (albeit at a higher
cost in time and money)" (quoting United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685
(1st Cir. 1991))). Further, the court saw something unseemly in a rule of selective waiver
which involved the government in "obfuscating the 'truth-finding process' . . . .The
investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring to light illegal activities, not to
assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public domain." In re
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303. Where the initial disclosure of protected information was
to an "adversary," the Sixth Circuit found "no compelling reason for differentiating waiver
of work-product from waiver of attorney-client privilege." Id. at 306. Accordingly, the court
found that Columbia/HCA had also waived any work-product protections through its
disclosure to the DOJ. Id. at 306-07.
93. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 308 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Although
acknowledging that privileges are to be narrowly construed to further the truth-seeking
process, Judge Boggs noted that waivers of established attorney-client privilege are also to
be viewed narrowly with a presumption that favors privilege protection. Id. ("When the
question is whether the attorney-client privilege is waived by certain actions, the
presumption shifts in favor of preserving the privilege." (citing In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d
430, 440 (6th Cir. 1997))).
94. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 308 (Boggs, J.,dissenting). Rather, the judge
stated that the court ought to examine the basis for the third-party waiver rule in evaluating
selective waiver, noting its traditional basis that the privilege must not have been necessary
to produce the initial communication by the client to the lawyer if the client later discloses
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Judge Boggs advocated a "more pragmatic approach," focusing on the

incentives for corporate privilege holders under the third-party waiver rule

95
and the public policy underlying cooperation with government agencies.

Judge Boggs noted that "questions of 'policy'... are at the heart of the
privilege inquiry" and that "federal courts have regularly analyzed whether
[the] rules [regarding privilege] are 'in the public interest' or whether [they]
would have undesirable side effects." '96 Judge Boggs found significant

benefits in a government investigation exception to the third-party waiver
rule, emphasizing the importance of efficacy in government investigations

and the need to create incentives to permit voluntary disclosures to the
government where "the government has no other means to secure otherwise

privileged information." 97 He noted that the incentives created under the
majority view of third-party waiver would rationally result in "neither the
98
government nor any private party" obtaining the privileged information.
Therefore, Judge Boggs concluded that selective waiver furthered the truthseeking process by increasing total access to information despite prohibiting
disclosure to third-party litigants. 9 9 Judge Boggs concluded that "[a]s the

harms of selective disclosure are not altogether clear, the benefits of the
increased information to the government should prevail."' 100

the confidential information to a third-party. Id. at 308-09. The judge found this principle's
underlying premise flawed. Id. at 309 ("That a client is willing to disclose privileged
information to the government at time T2 indicates very little indeed about whether she
would have communicated with her attorney, absent the promise of the privilege, at time
TI."). Judge Boggs also commented on the majority's survey of existing circuit court
precedent regarding selective waiver, pointing out the distinct circumstances present in
several of the opinions rejecting an application of selective waiver and noting that "the
authority arrayed in favor of the court's rule is not overwhelming." Id. at 307.
95. Id. at 309-10.
96. Id. at 310 (noting an "extensive 'policy' inquiry" undertaken to formulate a
psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1
(1996))). Judge Boggs stated, "I can find no rule narrowly constraining the considerations
that courts may take into account in developing rules regarding a common law privilege or
requiring that courts turn a blind eye to the practical effect of the privilege rules that they are
charged to create." Id.
97. Id. at 311-12. Judge Boggs rejected the majority's notion that the government could
discover the same information without access to privileged corporate information with
increased expenditure of investigative resources, "The court's argument about the adequacy
of other means, suggesting that the only difference between them and voluntary disclosure is
cost, requires the premise that all privileged information has a non-privileged analogue that
is discoverable with enough effort. That premise, however, does not hold." Id. at 311. Judge
Boggs further found that placing the interests of government access to information over
those of private litigants was entirely rational because government investigations are
"generally more important" and "more likely to be in the public interest" than private suits.
Id. at 312.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 307 ("I am convinced that a government investigation exception to the thirdparty waiver rule would increase the information available over that produced by the court's
rule and would aid the truth-seeking process ....").
100. Id. at 311.
Judge Boggs was unpersuaded by the majority's concerns over
administrative difficulties and line-drawing exercises. The judge opined that the court could
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Most recently, the lead plaintiffs in a federal securities class action
successfully compelled production of 220,000 pages of defendant Qwest
Communications' protected documents.' 0 ' Plaintiffs claimed that Qwest
had waived any applicable privileges protecting the documents by
voluntarily producing them to the SEC and the DOJ despite confidentiality
agreements negotiated with both government agencies.' 02 Echoing the
concerns of other circuits, the court found that selective waiver did not
advance the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege to
encourage frank communications between counsel and client.10 3 In
addition, the court questioned the need for selective waiver to encourage
corporate cooperation with government investigations.
Based upon
Qwest's production of 220,000 pages to the government in the absence of
any controlling selective waiver protection, the court rejected "the
contention that companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement
absent protection under the selective waiver doctrine."' 04 Unlike the other
courts to reject selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit also emphasized the
gradual modification process of the common law that "goes inch by
inch."' 1 5 The court equated Qwest's request for continued protection to a
request for an entirely new "government investigation privilege," which
would represent "a leap, not a natural, incremental next step in the common
craft a "rule-like" doctrine of selective waiver to government agencies that would operate as
a bright line much as the general rule of third-party waiver does. Id. at 313.
101. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006).
102. See id. at 1182. Before turning the documents over to the government, Qwest
negotiated confidentiality agreements with the SEC and the DOJ by which the government
agreed not to disclose them to nongovernment third parties. Id. at 1181. Although Qwest
produced the documents pursuant to subpoena, Qwest disclaimed any argument that its
production of the documents was involuntary. Id. at 1181 n. 1.
103. Id. at 1195. The court further suggested that selective waiver could potentially
undermine the purpose of the attorney-client privilege by discouraging corporate employees
from talking freely with corporate counsel if they are aware that the corporation can waive
the privilege to the government only without risking a further waiver. Id.
104. Id. at 1193. The court held that Qwest's negotiation of confidentiality agreements
did not warrant protection of the documents from production to the civil litigants. Although
the agreements contained some limitations on the government's disclosure of the documents,
they allowed the agencies significant leeway in the use of the documents for law
enforcement purposes. Many of the documents had been used in a manner that had caused
them to be widely disseminated, and Qwest essentially conceded that such widely
disseminated information had lost the protection of privilege despite selective waiver or the
confidentiality agreements. Id. at 1194. The court envisioned an administrative nightmare
created by application of selective waiver where the court would have to analyze all 220,000
pages to ascertain which had been kept private by the government. Id. In refusing to hold
that the confidentiality agreements negotiated between Qwest and the government justified
selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit was careful to avoid stating any general rule regarding the
effect of confidentiality agreements on waivers that could be applied in a future case. Id.
(finding that "[t]he record does not support reliance on the Qwest agreements with the SEC
and the DOJ to justify selective waiver" and that "[i]n short, Qwest's confidentiality
agreements do not support adoption of selective waiver" (emphasis added)).
105. Id. at 1192 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 24
(1921)).
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law development of privileges and protections."' 06 In sum, the Tenth
Circuit found common law development ill-suited to the task of protecting
cooperating corporations from privilege waivers.
Therefore, as federal authorities have increasingly emphasized "authentic
cooperation" by corporate targets that may involve some privileged
disclosures, circuit courts have gradually lined up to reject waiver
protection for those companies in third-party civil litigation. Companies are
increasingly finding themselves caught between the "rock" of federal
investigation and the "hard place" of massive civil exposure. 10 7
D. FederalSelective Waiver Legislation
In response to mounting concerns in Congress over the negative effects
of corporate privilege waivers following disclosure to government entities,
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure published
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 for notice and comment in August
2006.108 The published rule governed waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine generally and addressed inefficiencies
created by common law waiver doctrine in the context of complex
contemporary civil discovery. 109 In addition, subsection (c) of the proposed
106. Id.
107. The case law in the state courts regarding selective waiver is inconsistent. Compare
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ga. 2005) (denying selective waiver of
attorney-client and work-product protections in connection with government investigations),
and McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 820-21 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 2004), with Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL
31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002) (permitting the selective waiver of protected
materials to government officials as "the more prudent policy"). See also Nolan Mitchell,
Note, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the Limits of Federal
Power Over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 691, 722 (2006) ("That the same facts can
produce contrary results, and that the validity of selective waiver agreements now depends
on the jurisdiction in which third-party claims are brought, demonstrates that variant state
selective waiver rules provide corporations with little certainty, and undercut the law in
states like Delaware where such agreements may be upheld.").
108. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 9. Although the proposed
amendment is currently being reviewed through the rule-making process, the concerns that
led to the proposal originated in Congress. See Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., to
Leonidas Ralph Mecham, supra note 8 (requesting that the U.S. Judicial Conference "initiate
a rule-making on forfeiture of privileges").
109. The proposed rule was not limited to treating the problem of selective waiver to
government entities and was designed to bring predictability to the common law principles
of waiver applicable to both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. May
15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R. Evid 502
(Proposed 2006), at 5. The proposal covers waiver of the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine generally and also addresses perceived inefficiencies created by common
law waiver doctrine in the context of complex contemporary civil litigation. Id.; see also id.
at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 4 (noting that the rule published for comment had
"two major purposes," to "resolve some longstanding disputes in the courts about the effect
of certain disclosures" and to respond to "the widespread complaint that litigation costs for
review and protection of material that is privileged or work-product have become
prohibitive"). It would protect civil litigants from broad subject matter waivers except in
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rule represented the first attempt to provide comprehensive waiver
protection for corporations making disclosures to the federal
government.'l 0 The selective waiver provision of proposed Federal Rule of
cases of intentional and misleading disclosures. See id. at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006),
at 11 ("[A] subject matter waiver ... is reserved for those unusual situations in which
fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to protect
against a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the
adversary."). The proposal would also protect litigants from waivers associated with
inadvertent disclosures where the disclosing party has taken reasonable precautions against
disclosure and has promptly made reasonable efforts to rectify the disclosure. See id. at Fed.
R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 7. The proposal, thus, adopts the middle ground approach
to inadvertent disclosure in the federal case law and rejects a rule of strict liability for an
inadvertent disclosure which "threatens to impose prohibitive costs for privilege review and
retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery." See id. at Fed. R. Evid. 502
(Proposed 2006), at 8. Further, proposed Rule 502 would allow litigants to have complete
control over the effects of privileged disclosures to their civil adversaries by allowing them
to negotiate binding agreements regarding the return of privileged information regardless of
the caution exercised in producing them during discovery. See id. at Fed. R. Evid. 502
(Proposed 2006), at 10-11 (allowing parties to continue the established practice of
negotiating confidentiality and non-waiver agreements which will bind the parties thereto).
The rule provides assurances of protection not available under current federal precedent,
however, by allowing federal courts to issue non-waiver orders enforceable against
nonparties in any federal or state proceeding. Id. at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 10.
"[T]he rule contemplates enforcement of 'claw-back' and 'quick peek' arrangements as a
way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege and work product."
Id. This provision allows parties maximum flexibility to negotiate the return of privileged
information regardless of the caution exercised in producing it during discovery. Under an
appropriate court order, litigants can voluntarily exchange information in discovery with
little or no preproduction privilege review of the disclosed information while maintaining the
protection of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine against the adversary to
whom they are disclosing, as well as against all other adversaries in other federal or state
proceedings. See id. Unlike the mixed response to the concept of selective waiver, the
response to these proposed provisions has been quite favorable: Counsel, judges, and clients
uniformly support this protection that eliminates waiver under common law as a result of lost
confidentiality. See May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note
17, at 3-4. These provisions have been recommended by the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules and appear likely to take effect. Id. at 4; see generally Kenneth S. Broun &
Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal
for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 211 (2006) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the operation of the proposed rule and its goals).
110. Selective waiver legislation has been explored previously, however. Because of its
importance to its enforcement mission, the SEC has long fought to overcome the judicial
rejection of selective waiver protection through legislation and regulation. For example, in
1984, the SEC proposed a selective waiver amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to Congress, which would have allowed parties to disclose privileged materials to the
SEC without waiving privilege protection for the same materials in other proceedings. See
SEC Statement in Support of Proposed § 24(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 16
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 461 (Feb. 23, 1984). The House committee to which the SEC
submitted the proposal took no action on it. See SEC Oversight and Technical Amendments:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 34, 51 (1984). More recently, in
2004, the SEC unsuccessfully supported selective waiver as part of the Securities Fraud
Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act. See H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2004). In
2002, the SEC proposed a selective waiver regulation pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670
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Evidence 502 provided that disclosure of protected information to a federal

government agency would not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or the work-product doctrine as to any other persons or entities. II
Thus, the proposed evidence rule would have permitted corporate and
individual litigants to share their protected information with federal officials

in connection with agency investigations or enforcement actions of any
kind without waiving privilege as to third-party litigants seeking to pursue
them civilly. 112 Importantly, this proposed rule of selective waiver would
have protected litigants cooperating with federal investigations from thirdparty requests for similar disclosures, whether in state or federal
proceedings.11 3 The published rule adopted the Diversified approach to

selective waiver by foreclosing third-party access to protected information
previously disclosed to federal government agencies even in the absence of
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). Like the proposed legislation,
the regulation would have protected parties making voluntary disclosures to the SEC from
findings of waiver in other proceedings. Despite noting an important public interest in
selective waiver due to "expeditious and efficient investigations" that "obtain appropriate
remedies for investors more quickly," the SEC ultimately withdrew the regulation due to
concerns over its authority to adopt selective waiver via regulation. Id. at 71,694. Unwilling
to adopt a regulation that might lead cooperating companies into a false sense of protection
in making disclosures to the SEC, the SEC withdrew the proposed regulation but vowed to
"continue to follow its policy of entering into confidentiality agreements" and to "vigorously
argue in defense of those confidentiality agreements where litigants argue that disclosure of
information pursuant to such agreements waives any privilege or protection."
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6312-13 (Feb. 6, 2003). Recently, Congress has accepted a broader form of selective
waiver, but in a more limited context. The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006
provides that disclosures to federal and state banking regulators do not waive privileges as to
other parties. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006).
111. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 2. The language of the rule published for comment
read:
Selective Waiver. In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication
or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection-when made to a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority--does not operate as a waiver
of the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities.
Id. The rule specifically provided that state law would control the effect of disclosures to
state agencies or officers. Id. Further, the rule would not have limited or expanded the
authority of a government agency to disclose protected information. Id.
112. Although the controversy surrounding selective waiver has arisen primarily in the
context of corporate cooperation with government investigations where waiver of privilege
and work-product protection covering internal corporate investigations is most likely to
advance a government investigation, the proposed amendment would treat corporate
privilege holders and individual privilege holders similarly. Both would be insulated from
waivers to third-party nongovermment litigants when sharing protected information with a
federal agency. See id.
113. Because a privilege rule enacted through the federal rule-making process cannot
bind state courts and because rules of privilege must be passed by Congress, the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplates that Congress must directly enact
Rule 502. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000).
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a confidentiality agreement."l 4
The Advisory Committee Note
accompanying the proposal expressed concern that requiring a
confidentiality agreement would destroy the predictability the selective
waiver rule was designed to create by generating disputes over the degree of
protection afforded by particular agreements negotiated with the
government.1 15 Finding that the entry of a confidentiality agreement with
the government "has little to do with the underlying policy of furthering
cooperation with government agencies that animates the rule," the Advisory
Committee published a selective waiver rule that would have provided
protection without such an agreement. 116
The selective waiver provision of proposed 502 generated much
controversy and the public comment from the legal community "was almost
uniformly negative." 1 7 Ironically, corporate counsel who have long sought
selective waiver protection in the courts opposed the proposed evidence rule
because it would eliminate the most readily identifiable punitive
consequence for corporations cooperating with the government. They
claimed that selective waiver would further damage the relationship
between corporate counsel and individual employees by emboldening the
government and encouraging more waivers. In addition, opponents of the
proposal acknowledged concern that palliative selective waiver legislation
for cooperating corporations could impede ongoing efforts to derail the
government policies that generate waivers, such as the Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act. In response to the hue and cry, the Advisory
Committee found the question of selective waiver to be "essentially
political" and deleted the selective waiver provision from the proposed
waiver rule submitted to the Standing Committee.' 18
Although opponents of federal law enforcement policies and selective
waiver legislation won the battle in the rule-making arena, the war over
federal policy and the need for selective waiver continues to rage. The
114. See Diversified Indus., Inc., v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978); see also May
15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R. Evid. 502
(Proposed 2006), at 9 (noting that the committee "rejected" the confidentiality agreement
condition "for a number of reasons").
115. Specifically, the Advisory Committee found that "[i]f a confidentiality agreement
were a condition to protection, disputes would be likely to arise over whether a particular
agreement was sufficiently air-tight to protect against a finding of a general waiver, thus
destroying the predictability that is essential to proper administration of the attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity." Id.
116. Id.
117. See May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at
Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 1.
118. Id. at Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 3. Although
apparently persuaded to eliminate selective waiver by the negative public comment, the
Advisory Committee was aware of the controversial nature of the proposal from the outset
and placed subsection (c) of the rule originally published in brackets to indicate that the
committee had not reached agreement as to the advisability of the provision. See May 15,
2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R. Evid. 502
(Proposed 2006), at 2.
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Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules recommended a letter to Congress
on its study of selective waiver and included proposed language for federal
selective waiver legislation should Congress wish to enact it. 119 The draft
language provides in pertinent part:
(a) Selective Waiver.-In a federal [or state] proceeding, the disclosure of
a communication or information protected by the attomey-client privilege
or as work-product-when made for any purpose to a federal office or
agency in the course of any regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
favor
process-does not waive the privilege or work-product protection in
0
of any person or entity other than a [the] federal office or agency.12
Unlike the proposed evidence rule, the draft language reserves judgment
on the enforceability of selective waiver protection in state courts. Like the
proposed rule, however, the draft statutory language does not require
confidentiality agreements as a precondition for protection.
Therefore, Congress will provide the next venue for debate over selective
waiver. Because the concerns that led to rule making on the issue
originated in Congress, there is likely to be some legislative support for the
concept. Furthermore, Congress adopted selective waiver protection on a
narrow basis for disclosures to banking and regulatory institutions in 2006,
signaling acceptance of the concept. 12 1 Still, the powerful corporate forces
that opposed the concept in rule-making proceedings are certain to appear
in vocal opposition to any proposed legislation.

II. THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL FOR FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
OF CORPORATE ENTITIES
The stated purpose of selective waiver is to "further[] the important
policy of cooperation with government agencies, and [to] maximize[] the
effectiveness and efficiency of government investigations."' 22 There is
little debate about the legitimate public interest in effective corporate
123
oversight in light of the recent wave of costly corporate scandals.
119. See May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at
Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 1-5. The Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure has decided to make the Advisory Committee report on
selective waiver available to Congress upon request. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
120. May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at Draft
of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 4 (alteration in original).
121. The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 provides that disclosures to
federal and state banking regulators do not waive privileges as to private parties. 12
U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006).
122. May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R.
Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 9.
123. In recent years, government investigations of corporate fraud at entities such as
WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia Communications, HealthSouth, and Arthur Andersen LLC

have generated charges and headlines. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that "the
subject of organizational accountability has been brought to the fore by a series of highprofile corporate scandals that have shaken the public's confidence in the way that some of
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Similarly, there is little disagreement over the importance of corporate
cooperation with law enforcement to ensure timely and effective oversight.
Federal departments and agencies have limited resources available to
investigate often intricate schemes spanning complex corporate
structures. 124 It is well accepted that corporations play an important part in
uncovering potential wrongdoing and in pointing government investigators
in the right direction. 12 5 The recent allegations of widespread stock-option
backdating at public companies serve as a reminder of the importance of
corporate cooperation.
The options backdating scandal has been
characterized as "one of the broadest corporate scandals" since the
"overseas bribery scandal of the 1970's." 126 Commentators have noted that
our largest companies conduct business"); McNulty Statement, supra note 25 (noting that
"[t]he public's trust in corporate America was deeply shaken by the large-scale bankruptcies
of companies like Enron"). Although emphasizing that the "overwhelming majority of
corporations .. .operate morally and productively in the best and highest interest of their
shareholders and the country," members of the Corporate Fraud Task Force have stated the
need for "a comprehensive response" to these recent "intolerable legal and ethical
misdeeds." See Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., A Day with Justice (Oct. 28, 2002)
(on file with author).
124. In one recent internal company probe of a stock-option backdating scheme
conducted by United Health Group, Inc., outside corporate counsel looked at "almost four
million documents" and conducted "more than 80 interviews of employees and other
witnesses." Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4. Another company reported that the cost of a
similar internal investigation amounted to approximately $70 million. Id.
125. Id. In particular, corporate cooperation allows for a speedy government response to
instances of illegality, which is a critical component of arresting corporate fraud before it
causes significant additional damage to employees, investors, and the market generally. Id.
(noting that "the outsourcing approach has allowed the government to move unusually
swiftly" and that federal prosecutors were able to charge a high-level executive in
connection with illegal option backdating and slush fund practices based solely on interviews
and investigation by outside company counsel). Prosecutors also contend that timely
responses serve an important deterrent purpose. See Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at pt.
VI ("In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to
encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself...
Accordingly, a corporation's cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and
locating relevant evidence."); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6926, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003) ("Although the Commission must
verify that internal reports are accurate and complete and must conduct its own investigation,
doing so is far less time consuming and less difficult than starting and conducting
investigations without the internal reports."); Comey, supra note 45, at 4 ("Cooperation
enables the government to gather the facts before they're stale. Cooperation assists the
government in fully investigating the wrongdoing and figuring out who the wrongdoers are.
It also assists us in minimizing victims' losses and husbanding resources so we can give
folks money back through restitution. Rewarding cooperation facilitates all of these
important things."). Even representatives of the corporate bar who criticize the current DOJ
policy agree that internal investigations and corporate cooperation with government
investigators are in the best interests of companies, the vast majority of which strive to
maintain the highest standards of legality. See, e.g., Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 52, at
4 ("The government has every right to expect corporations to be good citizens by voluntarily
disclosing corporate misconduct and by taking prompt, effective steps to punish
wrongdoers.").
126. Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4. Indeed, former Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty has stated that the current backdating investigations represent "the next chapter in
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of every
"federal authorities can't possibly do thorough examinations
27
1
counsel.
corporate
to
"outsourcing"
without
company"
The real debate rages over whether it is appropriate to encourage such
cooperation in the form of waivers of the sacrosanct corporate attorneyclient privilege and work-product protection. 128 The recent opposition to
selective waiver largely rests upon the unrealistic premise that federal law
enforcement can and should operate in the twenty-first century without
seeking privileged and protected information from corporate targets of
investigation. Many opponents of selective waiver present a false choice
between (1) a federal enforcement universe with no governmental requests
for corporate waivers (and no selective waiver protection, either) and (2) a
universe that wholeheartedly embraces current government policies that
generate corporate waivers, but with the protection of selective waiver.
When all the heated rhetoric surrounding the corporate charging policy is
swept aside and the policy is compared to well-accepted prosecutorial
techniques utilized in the individual context, it becomes clear that corporate
privilege waivers, in some circumstances, are a necessary and appropriate
component of corporate cooperation. For that reason, government policies
that in some way reward waivers are likely to and should remain. While
this undoubtedly will affect the way in which corporate targets and their
employees approach internal investigations, the potentially dangerous
collateral consequences of corporate waivers will in no way be exacerbated
by federal selective waiver legislation and can be minimized through the
protection it would offer.
A. Privilege Waivers as a Legitimate Form of Cooperation
How can privilege waivers constitute an appropriate form of
cooperation? It is a time-honored and accepted practice to reward the target
of a criminal investigation with favored treatment at charging or sentencing
129
in exchange for making the job of the prosecuting authority easier.
Targets of criminal investigations are often asked to come clean and reveal
the details of their crime in exchange for more lenient treatment. 130 No one
would argue that it is inappropriate to ask an individual to waive his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and share all pertinent
information about a crime in order to obtain a reduced charge or a lighter
sentence. 13 1 The DOJ policy that conditions corporate charging decisions,
the Justice Department's fight against corporate corruption." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4.
128. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.

129. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see also LaFave, supra note 29, §
21.1(a).
130. LaFave, supra note 29, § 21.1(a).
131. See Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363 (noting that individual plea agreements are often
induced "by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of charges,
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in part, on corporate disclosures merely reflects this time-honored tradition
as it applies to the corporate defendant.
It is true that waivers of the attorney-client privilege as a component of
cooperation are unique to corporate defendants. This is entirely due to the
unique nature of the corporate person. Rarely, if ever, would an individual
target be asked to waive the attorney-client privilege in order to cooperate
with the government. Once an individual waives his Fifth Amendment
rights, he has provided all the information needed to obtain favorable
treatment from the prosecuting authority without any reference to attorneyclient privileged information: "Tell us what you know about the scheme,
Mr. Smith." Because corporations can act only through the numerous
individuals who run them, uncovering the "knowledge" of the corporate
entity is a different task. The institutional knowledge of a corporate target
derives from the collective knowledge of the group of individuals acting on
the company's behalf. Due to corporate practices of using counsel to
oversee corporate compliance and internal investigations, the collection of
information that comprises the corporate "knowledge" regarding a
procedure or transaction often exists in the form of documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. Although it is
possible for a corporation to cooperate with the government by providing
some unprivileged information, it is often difficult for a corporate target to
come clean and share what it knows in the way that individuals routinely do
Therefore, both
without providing otherwise protected information.
individual and corporate targets waive privileges to obtain benefits from the
The individual waives his Fifth Amendment
prosecuting authority:
privilege to give the government all it needs, and the corporation waives its
attorney-client privilege to accomplish the same objective.
B. Corporate Waivers and Coercion
Even if waiver can serve a legitimate law enforcement function, current
government policy would still be inappropriate if such waivers by corporate
targets were truly involuntary or coerced as some critics have suggested.
Many commentators argue that waivers generated by the DOJ policy are not
voluntarily made because disclosing companies are desperate to be deemed
"cooperating" in order to avoid the death penalty often represented by a
corporate indictment. 132 In light of existing practice and precedent
regarding the voluntariness of cooperation with government investigations,
this argument appears overblown.
As settled law makes clear, federal investigators lack the power to
133
compel a corporation's production of privileged and protected materials.
and thus by fear of the possibility of greater penalty upon conviction after a trial" (citations

omitted)).
132. See supra note 51.
133. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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The disclosure of such protected materials must be made with the consent
of the corporation acting through senior management and counsel. While
the pressure to disclose protected information to federal agencies is
undoubtedly powerful and difficult to resist, that is not the same thing as an
involuntary or compelled disclosure. Corporations, well represented by the
best trained, experienced, and most highly paid counsel, choose to disclose
after rationally weighing the costs and benefits of such waivers. 134 A
corporation may always insist upon the government's obligation to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt without the benefit of protected internal
corporate information. The Delaware Chancery Court, arguably the most
respected court in the country on corporate matters, acknowledged as much
in upholding selective waiver for a corporation cooperating with an SEC
"There is a balance in place already-whether the
investigation:
corporation should air its dirty laundry in exchange for mercy or whether to
force the law enforcement agency to do its own legwork (and possibly
overlook or fail to discover some of the incriminating evidence) at the cost
of more stringent treatment." 135 While the sharing of protected corporate
information may often appear to be the most prudent course in light of
potential exposure to criminal and other liability, such corporate disclosures
are the product of a rational weighing of alternatives and not of any
36
involuntary compulsion.'
Furthermore, the failure to waive corporate privileges in connection with
a federal investigation does not automatically result in a corporate
indictment or even "uncooperative" status under DOJ policy even when the
government has sufficient evidence to prosecute. First, the policy itself, in
all of its various forms, emphasizes that no one factor alone drives the
In addition, the department's track record
charging decision. 1 37
demonstrates the accuracy of the stated policy. In 2003, the DOJ entered
134. See Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1187 (explaining that "[clorporations are

perhaps the most rational targets in the criminal justice system and adjust their behavior
accordingly").

135. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 13, 2002).
136. Corporate targets have unsuccessfully played the "coercion" card in other contexts.
In In re John Doe Corp. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reviewed a district court order holding that any attorney-client privilege applicable to an
internal corporate document had been waived by the company's production of that document
to counsel for an underwriter in connection with a public offering of the company's
securities. 675 F.2d 482, 485-87 (2d Cir. 1982). The company argued that a waiver could
not stem from that disclosure because it was not voluntary and was "coerced by the legal
duty of due diligence and the millions of dollars riding on the public offering of registered
securities." Id. at 489. The Second Circuit bluntly stated that it viewed this argument "with
no sympathy whatsoever," acknowledging the corporate decision to make such disclosures in
order to gain "access to interstate capital markets." Id. Corporate targets that provide
privileged information to federal investigators and prosecutors similarly make a business
judgment that such disclosures are necessary to advance the best interests of the company
faced with criminal culpability.
137. See supra Part L.A and accompanying notes.
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non-prosecution agreements with both Merrill Lynch and Canadian Bank
CIBC for facilitating fraudulent transactions involving Enron. These
companies received this treatment due to the "speedy nature and full extent
of [their] cooperation, their agreement to very substantial remedial
measures, and public admission of misconduct ... 39.138 Neither entity
waived its attorney-client or work-product privilege. 1
The outrage over "coerced" corporate waivers seems particularly
exaggerated given that federal and state prosecutors routinely insist that
individual defendants waive constitutional and other important rights such
as the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury, and the right to appeal a conviction and
sentence in exchange for favorable treatment.140 Although the pressure on
individuals to waive such rights can be intense indeed, the pressure arising
out of legitimate fear of conviction as opposed to coercive government
tactics does not make such waivers "involuntary" under the law.141 Further,
138. Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1142 (describing Enron's "Nigerian barge
transactions" and noting that "Merrill Lynch admitted buying barges from Enron with the
understanding that Enron would buy them back after its earnings had been inflated" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
139. Id.
140. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also LaFave, supra note
29, § 27.5(c) (noting that most jurisdictions uphold individual defendants' waiver of
important constitutional rights, as well as the statutory right to appeal, due to "the
importance of plea bargaining, the value of saving appellate resources, and the advantages
gained by the defendant in entering the agreement").
141. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 ("While confronting a defendant with the risk of
more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion
of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and
permissible-'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas." (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973))). Although
corporate targets claim that fear of the corporate "death penalty" makes waivers of privilege
involuntary, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that individual waivers of
constitutional rights were coerced by fear of the actual death penalty. In Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and North Carolinav. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), defendants
pled guilty to avoid the potential imposition of the death penalty by a jury. Although these
defendants were undeniably strongly discouraged from insisting upon their constitutional
rights to a trial by jury due to the specter of the death penalty, the Court found no
constitutional problem or coercion. See Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 30-31 (discussing Brady and
Alford); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 ("We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's
desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range
of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law
for the crime charged."). Instead, the Supreme Court found such waivers to be the product
of difficult "choices" by criminal defendants inevitable in a system that tolerates and
encourages plea bargaining. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31; see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 286-87 (1998) (rejecting state death row inmate's claim that
conditioning clemency proceedings on an inmate interview "compelled" a waiver of the
inmate's Fifth Amendment rights: respondent "merely faces a choice quite similar to the
sorts of choices that a criminal defendant must make in the course of criminal proceedings,
none of which has ever been held to violate the Fifth Amendment"). Corporations similarly
make the difficult, but rational, choice to waive the attorney-client privilege to obtain
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the leverage on the defense side of the table is undeniably greater in the

context of corporate waivers-where investigations are routinely complex,
costly, and time-consuming-than in individual settings where waivers are
routinely made and upheld. 14 2 While individual defendants are often
bargaining for more lenient treatment at sentencing in waiving important
rights, corporate entities are capable of avoiding indictment altogether
through cooperation with government investigators.1 43
Therefore,
corporate waivers would appear to be even more "freely given" than the
individual waivers routinely permitted.
Finally, much of the criticism of the government cooperation policy

assumes that waiver represents a negative for a corporate target of
investigation. These critics suggest that opening an internal investigation
up to federal investigators will somehow damage the corporation. In fact,
the policy gives corporations a unique bargaining chip pre-indictment that
lacks a parallel in the context of individual prosecutions. 144 It can be used
to exonerate the corporation, as well as to incriminate. Indeed, several
companies have obtained favorable treatment from the federal government
due to their excellent cooperation where other policy factors may have
counseled in favor of prosecution. 4 5 In sum, corporate waivers under the
leniency. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8
(Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002).
142. See Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363 ("Defendants advised by competent counsel and
protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation."
(citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 758)).
143. See supra Part L.A and accompanying notes.
144. See Comment of Gregory P. Joseph to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure on Proposed FRE 502, at 12 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-003.pdf ("To the extent
that selective waiver facilitates exoneration as well as inculpation, permitting persons under
investigation to disclose privileged material gives them a freer choice."); Comey Interview,
supra note 5, at 3 (noting that "[c]orporations self-report and waive the privilege all the time
without being requested to do so by the Government. When corporations are victimized by
employees, they conduct an internal investigation and frequently decide to voluntarily
furnish the evidence to the authorities and seek prosecution"). Furthermore, it is important
to note that corporate defendants enjoy far greater consistency and transparency in charging
under the Thompson Memo than individual defendants have in other contexts. Although
there is no obligation to do so, the DOJ policy defines and exposes the factors governing the
broad discretion that prosecutors enjoy in charging decisions. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the "tradition of virtually
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation and scope of criminal
prosecution" (citation omitted)). By defining and publishing these factors to potential
corporate targets rather than keeping them hidden, the DOJ follows best practices. See
McNulty Statement, supra note 25.
145. In a recent article regarding the application of the Thompson Memo, former
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice Chris
Wray noted the "opportunities" it presents to a corporation under investigation. Wray &
Hurr, supra note 27, at 1171. He noted that many of the more traditionally accepted
Thompson factors such as the nature of corporate misconduct and preexisting compliance
measures are out of the company's control by the time the investigation arises: A company's
commitment to cooperation can dramatically enhance its chances of weathering such a crisis
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DOJ policy appear no more "coerced" than the waivers given in the
individual context and often serve to benefit the company.
C. Selective Waiver and the Flow of Information to CorporateCounsel
Critics of selective waiver also predict that individual corporate
employees will stop communicating crucial information to corporate
counsel once those employees realize the increased likelihood of exposure
to the government through a corporate privilege waiver. 146 Thus, according
to these groups, the information necessary to correct corporate crime will
the combination of
disappear as a result of the pressures created by
14 7
government policies and selective waiver protection.
This concern over the willingness of corporate employees to tell
corporate counsel what they know is not a new one and is not created by the
DOJ policy that has been under fire in the past few years or the prospect of
selective waiver legislation. Rather, this risk is the direct result of the
Supreme Court's formulation of the attorney-client privilege in Upjohn Co.
v. United States, which potentially protects communications between
corporate counsel and employees at all levels of the corporate hierarchy, but
makes the corporation the holder of the privilege at whose sole discretion
the privilege can be waived.' 48 This formulation of the privilege is unique
unscathed." Id. Homestore.com received an outright declination from the DOJ despite an
alleged conspiracy among its executives to commit securities fraud due to the company's
extraordinary cooperation. Id. at 1136 & n.214. In addition, Royal Dutch Shell received
similar treatment in an investigation of its overstatement of its oil reserves in 2002 through
its "full cooperation" with the government investigation. Id. at 1137 & n.215. These are but
two examples of companies that benefited from the opportunities provided by the federal
approach to corporate enforcement.
146. See supra note 52. Contradicting the argument that selective waiver will cause
further harm, these critics contend that individual employees are afraid to talk to corporate
counsel under existing law where no selective waiver protection exists due to the pervasive
"culture of waiver." See, e.g., Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, supra note
16, at 220 (testimony of Susan Hackett).
147. This argument that waivers will ultimately chill communication of needed
information is not a new one and highlights the anomaly that is the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate context. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, former
high-ranking officers of an insolvent corporation opposed the waiver of the corporate
attorney-client privilege by the trustee in bankruptcy, as the successor in interest to the
debtor corporation. 471 U.S. 343 (1985). The former officers argued that the possible
waiver of the privilege by such successors in interest would chill attorney-client
communications by corporate officials and thus should not be permitted. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument, stating that "the chilling effect is no greater here than in the
case of a solvent corporation, where individual officers and directors always run the risk that
successor management might waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect
to prior management's communications with counsel." Id. at 357.
148. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see, e.g., United States v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that individual
employees cannot prevent a corporation from waiving the privilege and disclosing the
otherwise confidential communications); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Ordinarily, the privilege belongs to the corporation and an
employee cannot himself claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of
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in that it does not give the individual communicating to counsel any control
over the ultimate use or disclosure of the information provided. 149 Scholars
have criticized the Upjohn formulation of the corporate attorney-client
privilege as insufficiently protective of individual employees for this
reason. 150 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has refused to alter the
corporate privilege on this basis and has rejected arguments that
communications to counsel will be chilled in light of potential waiver by
successors in interest to the corporation. 15'
The common wisdom supporting the Supreme Court interpretation of the
corporate privilege is that giving individual employees control over their
communications to counsel would be unworkable and inconsistent with the
interests of the corporate client.' 52 In addition, commentators have noted
that individual employees do not need control over their communications in
order to provide them with an incentive to communicate openly and
accurately: An employee's natural incentive to foster favorable relations
with the company in order to protect his livelihood serves as sufficient
incentive to protect the free flow of information to counsel. 153 Despite this
fundamental feature of corporate privilege, corporate counsel have long
relied upon the full disclosures of individual employees to gather data and
complete investigations.
While the DOJ policies and selective waiver may create increased
wariness on the part of individual employees who have knowledge of
wrongdoing, there is no reason to expect that the vast majority of corporate
employees will ignore their employment interests and suddenly refuse to
communicate with corporate counsel. 154
Nor is there any inherent
unfairness to individual employees when the corporation discloses their
communications between himself and the corporation's counsel if the corporation has
waived the privilege."); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); see also Model Code of Prof I Responsibility EC 5-18 (2003) ("A lawyer employed
or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a
stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity.").
149. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that

individual corporate employees could not assert attorney-client privilege for communications
to outside corporate counsel during an internal company investigation); United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
150. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporateand Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims:
A Suggested Approach, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 279, 306 (1984) ("Only where control over the
use of the communication is provided to the employee who speaks with counsel is it possible
to make one of the assumptions necessary to justify an attorney-client privilege: namely,
that the client might not be forthright without a privilege.").
151. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 357.
152. Id. at 349 (noting that corporate managers must have power to waive corporate
privilege consistent with their fiduciary obligations).
153. Comey Interview, supra note 5, at 3.
154. See Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the

Participants,63 St. John's L. Rev. 191, 381, 415 (1989) (concluding that a free flow of
information would continue between corporate executives and corporate counsel absent an
absolute corporate attorney-client privilege).
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communications with corporate counsel to the government. So long as
corporate counsel preface interviews of individual employees with
appropriate disclosures regarding the corporate control over the
communications and the possibility of waiver, there is nothing improper
about a company expecting its employees to assist in providing relevant
information for the benefit of the company.' 5 5 Even with such disclosures,
many corporate employees, particularly those with marginal, if any,
personal connection to the alleged wrongdoing, will continue to share
information with corporate counsel out of a desire to maintain the important
connection with their employer.156 Other employees who may have more
personal involvement with the issues at the center of the corporate
investigation may refuse to be interviewed after being informed of the
possibility that the company will turn information over to the government.
These employees may retain individual counsel and insist upon formal

155. Cautionary disclosures from corporate counsel are routinely given in interviews with
individual employees. See Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1183 ("It is not a new practice for
a corporation's lawyers to advise employees in the context of a criminal investigation that
they represent only the corporation and not the employee, and that this has implications for
the confidentiality of any communications with the employee." (quoting Buchanan, supra
note 3, at 600)); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2005)
(describing outside counsel's statement to an AOL manager during an internal investigation
that "the privilege belongs to the company and the company decides whether to waive it");
Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2004-2 (2004)
(noting that "it is typical for the [corporate] attorney to advise the employee that: (1) the
attorney represents the corporation, not the employee; (2) any information imparted to the
attorney is privileged, but the privilege is held by the corporation, not the employee; and (3)
it will be up to the corporation to decide whether to waive the privilege and share any
information imparted by the employee with third parties"). Some commentators have
suggested that "assurances" and "understandings" of confidentiality of communications to
corporate counsel have played a part in fostering those disclosures despite the lack of
protection actually provided by privilege law. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra
note 52, at 318 ("[Clorporate employees and officers are generally more willing to cooperate
where they receive a measure of assurance that their conversations with counsel will not be
divulged to government investigators or prosecutors."). Tacit promises of confidentiality by
corporate counsel would create serious ethical concerns. See Ass'n of the City of N.Y.
Comm. on Prof'I & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2004-2 (2004).
156. See Comey Interview, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that "[a] corporation must
explain to its employees the premium it puts on obtaining full information about misconduct
of any kind and that reporting wrongdoing to the authorities, including the regulators and
where appropriate criminal investigators, is a good thing to do, and is part and parcel of good
corporate citizenship. The message has to be sent that disclosure of misconduct will be
rewarded, and failure to disclose will be punished. Employees who have only made
mistakes will understand; employees who have information about others will also
understand, especially when the corporation protects them from retaliation; employees who
have committed crimes.., have no trust to undermine"). Individual employees will also
have a strong disincentive to lie to corporate counsel after receiving such warnings. In a
recent investigation of Computer Associates conducted by outside counsel in cooperation
with the government, individual employees were charged with obstruction of justice for
lying to corporate counsel knowing that their lies would be passed on to the government.
Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1147-48. The employees pled guilty to the obstruction
charges. Id.
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interviews with the government in which Fifth Amendment protections
57
apply. 1
In sum, any risk that employees will not talk to counsel emanates from
the Supreme Court's formulation of the corporate attorney-client privilege
and not from the DOJ policy designed to obtain waivers consistent with that
formulation of privilege or from the promise of selective waiver protection.
Any change needed to address that risk can be made only by changing the
corporate privilege itself to give individual employees some control over
corporate waivers. It would be inappropriate to attempt to circumvent the
accepted operation of the corporate attorney-client privilege by disturbing
the exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion in the DOJ policy or by
denying selective waiver protection that will serve the public interest. Even
with the threat of disclosure to the government, information will continue to
come to corporate counsel through the vast majority of individual
employees eager to assist their employer in investigating corporate

157. Contradicting the argument that cooperation through disclosure will "chill" speech
by wary individual employees, critics also complain that government policies undermine
important Fifth Amendment protections by forcing companies to interrogate individual
employees in a context where such protections do not apply. See, e.g., Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 52, at 157. According to this argument, individual employees will spill all they
know to the corporate counsel with whom they are comfortable, only to have their
unprotected disclosures served up to the government down the line. If, as critics suggest, the
individual employees cease making disclosures to corporate counsel in light of the Mirandalike warnings now necessary for internal investigations, it is difficult to imagine how Fifth
Amendment rights will be compromised in such discussions. If employees choose to talk to
corporate counsel despite the Miranda-like warnings described by critics of the DOJ policy,
it is hard to see how the government has made an end run around Fifth Amendment
protections and tricked corporate employees into making concessions they would not have
made to government officials. A corollary of this concern is the allegation that companies
will cooperate under the charging policy by scapegoating employees in an effort to obtain
leniency for the company. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Legal Issues and Sociolegal
Consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: CorporateProsecution, Cooperation,
and the Trading of Favors, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 643, 663-68 (2002); Dean Starkman, Pollution
Case Highlights Trend to Let Employees Take the Rap, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at B10. It is
true that the policy is designed to encourage companies to turn in culpable individuals. But,
it is important to recognize that business organizations obtain no guarantee of leniency
simply because the culpable individuals can be identified. Indeed, the whole purpose of the
corporate indictment and the charging guidelines is to avoid this consequence and to ensure
that the entity pays along with the employees where it is appropriate. Larry Thompson,
author of the Thompson Memo, quipped that without corporate criminal liability, a company
could simply "appoint a Vice-President in Charge of Going to Jail." Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Corporate Fraud Task Force Conference (Sept. 26, 2002).
Under the nine factors to be assessed in deciding whether to charge a corporation, serving up
individual corporate wrongdoers will not insulate the entity: "Charging a corporation for
even minor misconduct may be appropriate where the wrongdoing was pervasive and was
undertaken by a large number of employees or by all the employees in a particular role
within the corporation... or was condoned by upper management." McNulty Memo, supra
note 20, at 6; see also Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1145 (noting that "despite the
Thompson Memo's emphasis on cooperation, the weight of the Memo's other factors may
warrant corporate prosecution no matter how fully the company cooperates with the
authorities" and citing examples).
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malfeasance. So long as interviews of such employees are accompanied by
appropriate disclosures regarding the potential use of such information,
58
there is no inappropriate burden on the cooperating individual employee. 1
D. Selective Waiver and the Integrity of InternalInvestigations
The second related concern expressed by critics of the policy and
selective waiver is that corporations will decrease oversight and thorough
documentation of the efforts that are undertaken in order to shield
159 If it
potentially damaging information from government investigators.
materialized, such a trend away from careful corporate controls and internal
evaluation would clearly undermine the objectives of law enforcement to
produce law-abiding corporations and healthy markets. Most commentators
agree, however, that an overall decrease in internal corporate oversight of
this sort would be cutting off the corporate nose to spite its face and that it
160
is unlikely that responsible corporations will respond in this way.
First, any effort by a corporation to reduce the effectiveness of corporate
compliance programs would be irrational because it would hurt the
company under the DOJ policy. The existence of effective corporate
compliance programs is a separate factor that drives charging decisions
under the McNulty Memo. 16 1 Downsizing compliance to limit the
damaging information disclosed through "cooperation" would militate in
favor of prosecution on another important factor of the charging policy.
Indeed, the "rise in prosecutors' interest" in "the strength of companies'
compliance programs and corporate governance measures" has "led
predictably to an increase in the attention that companies themselves pay to
compliance-related matters."'] 62
158. To the extent that government policies may have some chilling effect on the
communications of some employees, there is no reason to expect that selective waiver
protection will exacerbate that problem. If we accept the suggestions of corporate counsel
that employees are currently aware of the "culture of waiver" that pervades federal
investigations, it is difficult to imagine how selective waiver protection will alter the
behavior of these employees.
159. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
160. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsideringthe CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 897, 901 (2006)
(describing the

"parade

of horribles envisaged,"

including

that "lawyers'

internal

investigations will become 'paperless"' and that "lawyers and clients will cease to conduct
internal investigations altogether").
161. McNulty Memo, supra note 20. The Thompson Memo first emphasized the
importance of reviewing corporate internal compliance programs as part of the charging
decision, providing that only authentic programs (as opposed to mere "paper programs")
would weigh against corporate prosecution. Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at 1.

162. See, e.g., Stephen M. Cutler, Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks Before the Directors' Education Institute at Duke University: Staying the Course
(Mar.

18,

2005),

available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch03l805smc.html

("Throughout corporate America there are signs of fundamental change-a profound shift to
a corporate culture of cooperation and compliance .... Boards of directors are becoming
stronger and more independent. They are starting to take decisive action in response to
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Furthermore, corporate criminal liability is far from the only risk that
corporate actors weigh when designing and operating compliance programs.
Complex regulatory obligations mandate internal mechanisms of review,
and fiduciary obligations of directors and officers obligate those corporate

actors to act in the best interests of the corporation in designing and
implementing corporate compliance programs. 163 Therefore, the cost of
eliminating thorough and effective compliance programs would be too dear
despite any perceived potential benefit to be gained under the DOJ
policy.164
Even if such an alarming trend develops, adoption of selective waiver
protection should curb it, not exacerbate it. As many privilege scholars

have noted, an effective privilege turns on a party's ability to predict and
control the distribution of its protected information. 165 It is the guarantee of
control over information that fosters open communications and

documentation of those communications.

Because the government

charging policy in no way deprives corporate clients of control over their
privileged information, the policy should not stifle the documentation of
privileged corporate information. Where the corporation, as the holder of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, retains the power to
accept or reject waiver to the government, potential government disclosure
does not discourage thorough investigation or record keeping. 16 6 Indeed,
ethics and compliance failures."); see also Alan Murray, Emboldened Boards Tackle
Imperial CEOs, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at A2 (commenting that "[t]here seems to be a
sea change going on here-a kind of maturation of American corporate governance").
163. Indeed, the emphasis on effective corporate compliance in the Thompson Memo
comes from the seminal decision of the Delaware Chancery Court regarding the fiduciary
duties of directors announced in In re Caremark. 698 A.2d. 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(finding that a company's directors did not breach their duty of care in connection with
alleged employee violations of federal and state health-care regulations, but holding that
directors have "a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and
reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused
by non-compliance with applicable legal standards").
164. Any concern that companies will decline to get counsel involved in important
oversight issues appears similarly unfounded. See Letter from Susan Hackett to David F.
Levi, supra note 15 (expressing concern about continuing corporate willingness to include
corporate lawyers "in even the most sensitive of decisions"). The failure to include counsel
would make any such consultations unprivileged in the first place and subject to compelled
disclosure by the government.
165. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 Duke L. J. 853, 860 (1998) ("It is the exclusionary
effect of the privilege that is fundamental to the candor being sought, not the secret context
of the communication being encouraged."); see also Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
402 (1981) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[Participants in confidential communications] must
be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected." (citations omitted)).
166. As discussed earlier, the government has no power to compel a corporation to waive
its privilege. The more rigorous controls on prosecutors now in place as a result of the
McNulty Memo will guarantee that demands for waiver will not be routine and that a refusal
to provide nonfactual privileged material relating the impressions and work product of
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the promise of leniency in exchange for thorough disclosures will
encourage it. If the privileged information gathered by a thorough and
well-documented investigation is too damaging, the corporation need not
disclose it. Therefore, the operation of the government charging policy
does not undermine a corporation's control over its information that could
lead to decreased documentation.
Judicial application of traditional waiver doctrine following deliberate
disclosures to the government, however, does deprive cooperating corporate
entities of control over the ultimate destination of their protected
information.
Under traditional waiver doctrine, the government is
incapable of giving disclosing entities any meaningful promise of
confidentiality. Corporations may wish to perform internal investigations
in order to eradicate wrongdoing and cooperate with government
investigators but may fear the specter of third-party waiver to the plaintiffs'
bar. Because corporations are unable to ascertain the costs and benefits of
disclosures to civil adversaries that may occur down the line, disclosing
companies may be more circumspect in what they document to avoid
67
damaging revelations not worth the cost in civil liability. 1
Selective waiver protection would place control of protected information
back into the hands of cooperating corporations. If corporations have some
guarantee that their protected information will stop where they choose,
there will be no incentive to sanitize or reduce reporting and documentation
of internal activities. With the adoption of dependable selective waiver
legislation, all disincentives to the corporation (as opposed to culpable
individuals) to investigate and document should disappear. Therefore,
contrary to much of the rhetoric surrounding this issue, disincentives to
corporate information gathering, if any, derive from the application of
traditional waiver doctrine and not from the operation of the DOJ charging
policy itself or from the promise of selective waiver. As such, the
traditional waiver doctrine ought to bend in response to legitimate societal
168
interests in effective corporate law enforcement.

corporate counsel will not be used against the corporation. McNulty Memo, supra note 20, at
8-11.
167. See Wray & Hurt, supra note 27, at 1173 (noting the uncertainties facing
corporations considering disclosures to the government: "Despite their efforts to limit the
scope of any waiver, companies cannot know for certain what materials are no longer
protected by the privilege and who may access them") (emphasis omitted)).
168. It is worthy of note that one of the only state courts to recognize the validity and
importance of selective waiver is the Delaware Chancery Court, a court long recognized for
its specialty in adjudicating corporate issues. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A.
18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002) (holding that disclosure to the
SEC pursuant to a confidentiality agreement did not constitute waiver of the work-product
privilege). It is hard to imagine that the Delaware court would have sanctioned the
protection of selective waiver for corporations cooperating with government officials if the
court had foreseen the parade of horribles for corporate management and investors such
protection would invite.
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Some may suggest that some corporate counsel will continue to sanitize
corporate documentation even with the protection of selective waiver
legislation. Any such tendency following adoption of selective waiver
protection would be contrary to the ethical obligations of corporate
counsel. 169 In this respect, it is important to emphasize that effective
corporate oversight is in the best interests of a healthy thriving corporate
entity.
As such, conduct by lawyers that eliminates important
documentation of compliance or decreases compliance efforts altogether
would almost always undermine the best interests of the corporate entity
that company counsel is retained to represent. While conflicting obligations
to individual employees potentially compromised by effective internal
investigations may discourage intense scrutiny in some circumstances,
rarely will the obligations to the company itself favor less oversight.
Indeed, if an internal investigation uncovered information truly damning to
the corporate entity itself, such as pervasive and recurring fraud throughout
numerous levels of the corporate structure, the company-as the sole holder
of the privilege-would remain free to refuse to divulge the results of its
investigation to the government. If, on the other hand, an internal
investigation revealed damning information about isolated actors only, it
would be in the company's best interests to uncover the information and
turn it over to the government even if it would harm the interests of the
individual employees implicated by the investigation. Many courts and
commentators have noted the conflict of interest that arises between
corporate counsel and the individual employees of the company in such
circumstances. 170 In sum, it is difficult to imagine competent counsel
working to protect the best interests of their corporate client consistent with
their ethical obligations by undercutting internal investigations or other
compliance programs with the protection of selective waiver in place.
E. Corporate Waivers Are Here to Stay
Some critics of selective waiver have suggested that current government
policies that generate corporate waivers could be a passing phenomenon not
169. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(a) (2003) ("A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents."); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2003) ("[A] lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.").
170. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted this inherent conflict
between the best interests of the corporation and those of its individual employees in the
context of a corporate internal investigation in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333,
340 (4th Cir. 2005). The court stated that it "would be hard pressed to identify how
investigating counsel could robustly investigate and report to management or the board of
directors of a publicly-traded corporation with the necessary candor if counsel were
constrained by ethical obligations to individual employees." Id.; see also Simons, supra note
2, at 1010; Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1182 ("At times, the interests of companieswho are eager to demonstrate genuine cooperation to prosecutors-are in tension with the
interests of individual employees.").
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warranting the alteration of traditional waiver principles. 17 1 To the
contrary, these policies are no passing fancy. Federal law enforcement
policies that encourage and reward corporate self-evaluation combined with
disclosures to the government have a long tradition within numerous federal
departments and agencies and have been used as tools to improve corporate
72
oversight and the health of the American market for over three decades.1
The method that they employ has been long accepted in the context of
individual prosecution, where leniency has routinely been exchanged for
assistance that involves the waiver of important rights.
Because of their successful track record and the public interests imperiled
by inefficient and ineffective corporate oversight, these policies have been
implemented more broadly and, to some degree, more aggressively over
time.
Given the mounting expense and complexity of corporate
investigation, such cooperation and voluntary disclosure programs have
become an indispensable part of the fabric of federal corporate
investigations.1 73 The performance of such internal investigations provides
no guarantee of eradicating ongoing wrongdoing committed by corporate
insiders or of deterring future improprieties within the same or other
institutions. It is the sharing of the results of those investigations with the
government that serves as a powerful tool to stop the corporate fraud that
damages markets and individuals alike. 174 For example, the ongoing
widespread investigation of stock-option backdating schemes at publicly
traded companies is being carried out primarily by outside corporate
counsel who are "feeding"
information to regulators and prosecutors in a
"real-time" fashion.175 Indeed, illegal backdating practices are so prevalent
that many would escape the attention of federal authorities without this
voluntary disclosure of damaging information. 176 Some of the important
information disclosed will necessarily fall within the protections of the
work-product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. This type of
collaboration between corporate entities and federal authorities cannot be
eliminated if this country is to continue taking corporate oversight
seriously. There would be little incentive for corporations to self-police in
this manner without the expectation of leniency created by the government
171. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002)

("Whether the pressures facing corporations in federal investigations present a hardened,
entrenched problem suitable for common-law intervention or merely a passing phenomenon
that may soon be addressed in other venues is unclear.").
172. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4 (explaining that federal regulators would
be incapable of identifying and correcting the recent wave of improprieties connected to the
backdating of stock options without the help of outside corporate counsel "feeding" the
government information).
174. Indeed, the DOJ has had significant success in prosecuting corporate fraud since the
adoption of the charging policy. See McNulty Statement, supra note 25, at 1-2 (detailing
prosecutorial history under the policy).

175. Bandler & Scannell, supra note 4.
176. Id.
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charging policy and other similar federal programs. In short, we neither can
nor should turn back the clock to the "circle the wagons" days of corporate
defense.' 77 Thus, the preference of opponents of selective waiver-a
universe in which corporations are never encouraged to share their
privileged information-is unattainable if the public intends to continue
taking white collar crime seriously.
Even if we accept that sharing of privileged corporate information in
exchange for leniency is a valuable technique that serves the public interest,
we need not embrace overly aggressive applications of the technique that
could ultimately undermine the goal of effective corporate oversight. As
noted by both critics and proponents of the Federal Principles of
Prosecution, there are some methods of cooperation that stop short of
disclosing privileged communications with corporate counsel.
It is
perfectly consistent with corporate law enforcement objectives to minimize
intrusion into the sacred arena of corporate privilege where it is possible to
do so while maintaining effective collaboration with corporate counsel.
Indeed, the recent outcry against federal law enforcement practices has
served an important purpose in ensuring that prosecutors execute their
178
duties with caution and proper regard for the public interests they serve.
In response to the criticisms that federal practice under the Thompson
Memo created a dangerous "culture of waiver," the DOJ altered its stated
policy to do just that. The new policy requires a "legitimate need" for a
government waiver request and directs prosecutors to seek "the least
intrusive waiver necessary to conduct a complete and thorough
investigation."' 179 It creates a "step-by-step" approach to requests for
disclosures that first seeks "purely factual information" that may or may not
be protected and seeks the mental impressions or advice of counsel only in
"rare circumstances." 18 0 In addition, the new policy implements procedural
protocols that mandate a central and senior review of government requests
for privileged or protected information.' 8' This policy protects the law
enforcement objectives crucial to the public interest without disregard for
the corporate interest in maintaining privilege protection where possible. It

177. See Mini-Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, supra note 16, at 44
(testimony of James K. Robinson, former Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Criminal Division
under President William J. Clinton) ("[T]he Justice Department and the SEC save enormous
resources . . . by doing this, and . . . the cat is out of the bag here on this. I think the
likelihood that that demon is going to be driven underground because we don't have a
selective waiver rule is ignoring the realities of life .... ").
178. See McNulty Memo, supra note 20, at 8-10 (requiring a "legitimate need" for the
request for privileged corporate information and developing a "step-by-step" approach to

requests for such information that seeks the protected impressions of counsel only in "rare"
cases).
179. Id. at 8-9.
180. Id. at 9-10.
181. Id. at 10.
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appears that the SEC may follow the DOJ's lead in revising its current
182
policy as well.
Although some legislators and members of the corporate defense bar
support the passage of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, the
existing enforceable limits on prosecutorial discretion in connection with
charging and settlement decisions are few indeed. 183 Given the extended
history of disclosures to government entities and the increasing need for
effective regulation and prosecution of corporate actors, disclosure of
otherwise privileged information to federal government investigators is
destined to continue in some form with or without the protection of
selective waiver. Even vocal critics of the government's current practices
agree that "it may not be unreasonable to seek a limited waiver prior to
declining prosecution" where "a company has conducted its own
investigation and voluntarily reported wrongdoing." 184 In today's complex

182. See Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall Street Journal Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/qw/2007/02/09/waiver-will-the-sec-follow-deputy-ag-mcnultys-lead/
(Feb. 9, 2007, 15:06 EST) (describing comments of SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins that the
SEC should consider "tightening its policies" to ensure that companies are not pressured into
waiving basic legal privileges).
183. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that "[t]he
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the
Nation's criminal laws. They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the
President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,"' subject only to constitutional restraints (citations
omitted)); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982) ("A prosecutor should
remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the
extent of the societal interest in prosecution."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978) ("In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute,
and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion." (footnote omitted)); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting "tradition of virtually unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning
the initiation and scope of a criminal prosecution" (footnote omitted)). In establishing and
disclosing guidelines for cooperation and charging, the DOJ conforms to prosecutorial best
practices that are not mandatory. See LaFave et al., supra note 29, § 13.2(f)(ii), at 684
("What is needed is for each prosecutor's office to develop a statement of general policies to
guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.").
184. Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 52, at 4. Even with the protection of legislation
prohibiting prosecutors from requesting corporate waivers, corporate counsel suggest they
would like to retain the option of "voluntarily" waiving privilege and obtaining leniency for
it in appropriate cases where the company has been ravaged by a rogue employee. See, e.g.,
Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, supra note 16, at 222-23 (testimony of
Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Association of Corporate Counsel).
Even in the absence of formal government "requests" for waivers, the availability of
leniency in such cases will necessarily maintain the incentive to disclose. Thus waivers will
be a continuing reality under any contemporary framework. Even under such a regime,
therefore, selective waiver protection would be important to protect companies making such
truly "voluntary" disclosures. See Mini-Hearingof the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
supra note 16, at 27 (testimony of James K. Robinson, former Assistant Att'y Gen. of the
Criminal Division under President William J. Clinton) ("[T]here will always be-whether
there is an express request from an assistant U.S. attorney or an SEC lawyer or not-
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world of corporate oversight that will continue to generate protected
disclosures to government investigators, third-party waiver represents the
most compelling and observable danger facing cooperating corporations
and the integrity of their internal investigations. The impact of third-party
waivers serves no legitimate function in connection with a government
inquiry and, in fact, impedes it. Legislatively eliminating the existing
punitive consequences of such disclosures in subsequent civil litigation will
benefit good corporate citizens and enhance the detection and correction of
damaging corporate corruption in the post-Enron era.
III. THE NEED FOR SELECTIVE WAIVER PROTECTION AND CONSISTENCY
WITH CONTEMPORARY WAIVER DOCTRINE

Almost all of the courts that have rejected selective waiver have found it
unnecessary to encourage corporate cooperation with law enforcement and
inconsistent with core privilege principles. 185 Closely examining these
judicial criticisms of selective waiver protection reveals an overly simplistic
response to the doctrine that ignores the flexibility that has characterized the
recent evolution of privilege and waiver doctrine in the courts and
scholarship.
A. The Need for Selective Waiver Protection
Many of the courts that have rejected selective waiver acknowledge that
corporate cooperation with law enforcement is a laudable objective that
serves the public interest, but maintain that selective waiver protection is
simply unnecessary to encourage cooperation in the form of corporate
privilege waivers.1 86 While companies routinely have been ordered to
disclose privileged information to civil litigants following disclosures to the
government, companies continue to provide protected materials to
government investigators. 187 Observing this trend, courts conclude that
companies do not need additional protections to encourage and maintain
cooperation with government investigations because they are already
willing to disclose protected information and pay the price of third-party
waivers.
powerful incentive for full cooperation by corporations, including, in some instances, the
waiver of the privilege ....
").
185. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
186. The majority in In re Columbia/HCA recognized that selective waiver would further

the search for truth, realize considerable investigative efficiencies, and possibly increase
corporate self-policing. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2002). Most courts to visit the issue have emphasized that selective

waiver is unnecessary to increase cooperation, however. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
187. See Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SECCorporationPrivilege, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 789, 822 (1984) (noting that over 425 corporations

participated in the SEC's voluntary disclosure program in 1979 when only one circuit had
adopted a rule of selective waiver in connection with such cooperation).
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As these courts note, it is clear that selective waiver is not necessary to
achieve some level of corporate disclosure to the federal government. This
does not signal the unimportance of waiver protection to such cooperating
corporations, however.188 Corporations are rational actors. 189 The waiver
to third-party litigants is simply one factor in the corporate cost-benefit
analysis that informs the decision of whether to waive the corporate
privilege in cooperation with the government. 190
Companies that
voluntarily disclose privileged information to government agencies under
current precedent have determined that the benefits of disclosure and
cooperation outweigh the likely costs of such cooperation in the form of
third-party waivers in light of the potential outcome of the particular
governmental inquiry and any threatened civil litigation. Therefore, the
continued rejection of selective waiver will not foreclose corporate
cooperation in investigations of this sort.
The rejection of selective waiver, however, necessarily means that the
cost-benefit analysis performed by some corporate entities facing
government investigations on varying subjects and of varying scope will
come out against disclosure due solely to the specter of waiver in civil
litigation. 19 1 As noted by one commentator cautioning corporations
regarding disclosures to the government:
When deciding whether to share privileged information with the
government, therefore, companies must consider the substantial risk that
such information could eventually be shared with and used against the
188. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in In re Qwest, the development of privilege doctrine
by the common law is a process of slow "accretion[]" which takes significant time to
develop. 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006). While the courts have increasingly rejected
selective waiver, the status of selective waiver has been open to debate for the past several
decades. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes. Thus, disclosing companies may have
held out some hope of cooperating without suffering the collateral cost of third-party waivers
(as indicated by Qwest Communications' very recent bid for protection). Thus, it is not
entirely accurate to assume that companies have disclosed to the government fully aware of
the price to be paid in civil litigation. Furthermore, companies spend considerable time and
money negotiating confidentiality agreements with government entities prior to making
disclosures of protected information. This also indicates cooperating corporations' genuine
concern over the release of their information to third parties.
189. See Wray & Hurt, supra note 27, at 1187 (noting that "[c]orporations are perhaps the
most rational targets in the criminal justice system and adjust their behavior accordingly").
190. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("[W]e cannot see how 'the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent
outside counsel to investigate and advise them' would be thwarted by telling a corporation
that it cannot disclose the resulting reports to the SEC if it wishes to maintain their
confidentiality.").
191. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8
(Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002) ("When courts amplify the risk of disclosure to include future
private plaintiffs, the scales begin to tip further in favor of corporate noncompliance with
investigative agencies. A rigid trend leading to such an unwholesome result seems unwise.
Instead, a practical rule that would reduce the risk of secondary unintended disclosure to
private plaintiffs from this initial balance would likely benefit both law enforcement
agencies and the future private plaintiffs they were established to protect.").

2007]

PROPOSEDSELECTIVE WAIVER LEGISLATION

179

company by third-party plaintiffs as well. Depending on the merit of the
civil claims and the damages sought, disclosure of such information could
result in breathtaking judgments or settlements, far in excess of any
92
criminal penalties levied by the government. 1
By eliminating a large and almost certain cost of disclosure to
government entities, selective waiver will necessarily encourage
cooperation through disclosure where it otherwise would be rejected.
Although courts and commentators are correct that companies will share
some information with the government even in the absence of selective
waiver protection, it cannot be contested that companies will share more
information with the doctrine of selective waiver-thus increasing the total
93
flow of information to the government. 1
In addition, courts have taken a "one-size-fits-all" approach to the need
for selective waiver that largely ignores the variety of oversight
mechanisms to which corporate actors may respond with protected
disclosures and the different incentives that may govern corporate decision
making in these different arenas. The DOJ is one of numerous federal
departments that seeks voluntary disclosures from corporate entities. For
example, the Department of Health and Human Services has a voluntary
disclosure program that encourages health-care providers to report possible
fraud in connection with Medicare and Medicaid programs. 194 A provider's
lack of cooperation and disclosure is treated as an aggravating factor for
consideration by the department's inspector general under this program. 195
Where exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs is a possible
sanction for failure to cooperate, a provider is likely motivated to provide
192. Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1174.
193. Indeed, Judge Boggs noted this "uncontroversial behavioral prediction" in his
dissent in In re Columbia/HCA: "Faced with a waiver of the attorney-client privilege over
the entire subject matter of a disclosure and as to all persons, the holder of privileged
information would be more reluctant to disclose privileged information voluntarily to the
government than if there were no waiver associated with the disclosure." In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 309-10 (6th Cir.
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). Because the adoption of selective waiver necessarily will
increase disclosures to the government by cooperating corporations, some critics of the
government charging policy within the defense bar oppose it out of concern that adopting
selective waiver will perpetuate the current "culture of waiver." It is important to note that
selective waiver in no way alters the existing balance of power between government
investigators and a target corporation.
Allowing selective waiver to government
investigators will increase disclosures to the government of protected information, but only
because it will decrease external costs of disclosure to corporations that are separate and
apart from the criminal investigation. Adopting selective waiver does not give the
government an additional bargaining chip or allow the prosecution to bring more pressure to
bear. It merely makes disclosures less costly to companies that choose to cooperate in this
way. Therefore, a doctrine of selective waiver benefits the corporate actors subject to the
pressures of third-party civil suits, but does not exacerbate the "culture of waiver" by adding
any tools to the government's arsenal.
194. See Health and Human Services Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg.
58,399, 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998).
195. See id. at 58,403.
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complete disclosures without serious consideration of the implications in
terms of civil liability. Defense contractors regulated by the Department of
Defense face similar concerns. 196 Therefore, selective waiver may be less
important in creating cooperation with the government in these contexts. In
other arenas such as securities fraud investigations, however, the threat of
massive civil exposure may weigh more heavily on the scale and counsel
against cooperative disclosures. In these situations, selective waiver
protection would indeed encourage such disclosures. Thus, it is impossible
to evaluate whether corporations "need" selective waiver to encourage
cooperation in general terms as courts have tried to do because the need for
the protection will depend heavily upon the context of the initial
government disclosures.
In seeking public comment on proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
502(c), the Evidence Advisory Committee specifically sought empirical
evidence demonstrating the amount of increased cooperation that would
result from selective waiver protection. 97 Not surprisingly, the committee
received nothing that would quantify the benefit of selective waiver. 198 It
would be impossible to pin down ex ante how companies faced with
unspecified government investigations and civil suits would behave with
and without selective waiver protection. This inability to quantify the
precise benefit to be gained by selective waiver should not serve to defeat it,
however. Questions of privilege and waiver have never been driven by
statistics, but have always been creatures of public policy. Indeed, to reject
selective waiver because some companies are already making disclosures to
the government without it, is to engage in a line of reasoning that would
defeat the attorney-client privilege itself. Although the privilege is
supported by an instrumental theory that its existence creates the
disclosures to counsel that it protects, this theory has been widely criticized
as lacking an empirical basis. 199 Commentators note that most clients
196. See also Debarment, Suspension and Ineligibility, 48 C.F.R. § 9.4 (2006); see also
Wray & Hurr, supra note 27, at 1115-17 (discussing Department of Defense voluntary
disclosure program that offers contractors leniency for self-monitoring and reporting).
197. See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed and Revised 2006), at 6, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEV Report_- Pub.pdf#page=4 (explaining that "[tihe

Committee is especially interested in any statistical or anecdotal evidence tending to show
that limiting the scope of waiver will 1) promote cooperation with government regulators
and/or 2) decrease the cost of government investigations and prosecutions").
198. See May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at
Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 1.
199. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of
Privilege,2000 Wis. L. Rev. 31, 31 ("Clients want the best legal advice. Most are therefore
strongly motivated to tell lawyers the truth.... When seeking legal guidance, smart
corporate actors come clean."); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and

Confusion: Privilegesin FederalCourt Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 112 (1956) (noting that
the theory that the attorney-client privilege promotes disclosure to counsel rests on "sheer
speculation"); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84

Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1619 (1986) ("There has never been empirical evidence that the
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would have strong motivations to communicate openly and accurately with
counsel to secure their legal rights even in the absence of any privilege
protection. 200 Yet the law readily accepts that, however unquantifiable,
there is some valuable benefit in increased disclosure to lawyers as a result
of the existence of the privilege. The same concept applies with equal force
to encouraging cooperation with government investigations. Although
many corporations will cooperate at some level without the protection of
selective waiver doctrine, we can be sure that the fullness of disclosures to
government
agencies will be enhanced by recognition of selective
20 1
waiver.
B. Selective Waiver and Core Principlesof Privilegeand Waiver
Courts have criticized selective waiver protection as inconsistent with
core privilege principles on three main grounds: (1) that selective waiver
fails to serve the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege to
encourage open communications to counsel and, instead, encourages the
sharing of information with an entity outside the confidential relationship;
(2) that selective waiver affords protection for a party who has sacrificed
the confidentiality of its protected information; and (3) that selective waiver
unfairly allows a party to make strategic use of privilege, disclosing its
protected information when it is advantageous and hiding it behind the
202
cloak of privilege when it is not.
First, it is not evident that all exceptions to settled waiver doctrine must
emanate from the policy of encouraging confidential communications
between client and lawyer. 20 3 The attorney-client privilege itself is an
exception to the fundamental policy of effective truth seeking in our
adversary system through the presentation of all relevant and reliable

privilege's existence actually promotes disclosure by clients, and there are intuitive reasons
for doubting that it often does so." (footnote omitted)); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilegein ShareholderLitigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12

Hofstra L. Rev. 817, 822 (1984) (noting that justification for the attorney-client privilege is
based upon an "educated guess about behavior").
200. See supra note 199; see also Edward J.Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral
Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 145 (2004).
201. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,

303 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that selective waiver would further the search for truth,
realize considerable investigative efficiencies, and possibly increase corporate self-policing).
202. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
203. Many critics of selective waiver have argued that the doctrine is not necessary to
encourage open communications with corporate counsel. As noted by the first U.S. court of
appeals to reject selective waiver, "'[T]he developing procedure of corporations to employ
independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them' would [not] be thwarted by
telling a corporation that it cannot disclose the resulting reports to the SEC if it wishes to
maintain their confidentiality." Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1981); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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information. 20 4 The necessary extrinsic public policy of encouraging
effective relationships between client and counsel carries sufficient weight
to trump that general policy. The law of privilege has always been driven
by such notions of public policy. The public policy of enhancing the
efficiency and effectiveness of corporate oversight to protect the American
market and the multiple constituencies served by the contemporary
corporation is the impetus behind the proposed change. It is difficult to
imagine a public policy more in keeping with the traditional purpose of
privilege protection.
Judge Boggs's dissent in In re Columbia/HCA disagreed with the federal
courts' rigid insistence on tying all exceptions to established waiver
doctrine to the justification for the existence of the privilege. 205 Judge
Boggs noted that "questions of 'policy"' are "at the heart of the privilege
inquiry" and that federal courts exercising their powers, under Federal Rule
of Evidence 501, have "regularly analyzed" whether the rules regarding
interest"' or whether they would have
privilege are "'in the public
"undesirable side effects." 20 6 Similarly, Professor Richard Marcus has
opined that "reference to the purpose of the privilege does not provide a
satisfactory guide in waiver decisions," noting that "the better focus would
be on purposes for waiver." 20 7 Therefore, deviations from traditional
waiver doctrine need not encourage confidential communications between a
client and his lawyer so long as they are justified by a public policy of
sufficient social importance. As discussed above, the doctrine of selective
waiver is supported by just such a socially desirable policy of encouraging
corporate cooperation with government investigations.
204. See Broun et al., supra note 47, § 72 (explaining that privileges "are clearly
inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light").
205. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 308-09 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Rather, the
judge stated that the court ought to examine the basis for the third-party waiver rule in
evaluating selective waiver. The judge noted the often-stated basis for third-party waiver
that the attorney-client privilege must not have been necessary to produce the initial
communication by the client to the lawyer if the client later discloses the confidential
information to a third party. The judge found the underlying premise of this principle-that
communications at one point in time are similarly motivated to the disclosure of those
communications at a later point in time-flawed. Id. at 309 ("That a client is willing to

disclose privileged information to the government at time T2 indicates very little indeed
about whether she would have communicated with her attorney, absent the promise of the
privilege, at time TI."). Judge Boggs also commented on the majority's survey of existing
circuit court precedent regarding selective waiver, pointing out the distinct circumstances
present in several of the opinions rejecting an application of selective waiver and noting that
"the authority arrayed in favor of the court's rule is not overwhelming." Id. at 307.
206. Id. at 310 (noting that the Jaffee Court engaged in "a policy inquiry to formulate a
psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law" (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
Judge Boggs stated, "I can find no rule narrowly constraining the
10-11 (1996))).
considerations that courts may take into account in developing rules regarding a common
law privilege or requiring that courts turn a blind eye to the practical effect of the privilege
rules that they are charged to create." Id.
207. See Marcus, supra note 199, at 1619 ("[Tlhe purpose analysis tends to lead to broad
waiver rules without affording any leeway to cope with the resulting costs.").
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Opponents of selective waiver also argue that it unfairly allows the
confidentiality of protected communications to be resurrected after it is
knowingly sacrificed for the tactical advantage of the privilege holder. As
the D.C. Circuit put it, "[T]he attorney-client privilege should be available
only at the traditional price: a litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality
must maintain genuine confidentiality. '208 Thus, critics claim that the
doctrine of selective waiver violates the most basic tenets of privilege law
that a party cannot willingly disclose protected information without
effecting a waiver.
A review of modem privilege doctrine demonstrates that selective waiver
would not be alone in these respects if adopted. A number of accepted
doctrines are evolving in the context of contemporary litigation outside the
arena of government investigation that allow for continuing privilege
protection following a strategic breach of confidentiality. Like selective
waiver these doctrines are not designed to encourage the free flow of
information to counsel.
The well-accepted joint-defense or common
interest doctrine shares many of the attributes that have caused concern in
the debate over selective waiver. This doctrine protects the confidential
communications of separately represented parties who share some common
legal interest. 20 9 While the joint-defense doctrine constitutes a privilege
separate and apart from the attomey-client privilege, its operation represents
a departure from established third-party waiver doctrine in the arena of
protected attorney-client communications.
The joint-defense doctrine
permits the voluntary sharing of protected attorney-client communications
with third parties outside that protected relationship so long as those third
parties share a common legal interest with the privilege holder.2 10 Despite
a voluntary breach in the genuine confidentiality of the information to
someone outside the protected relationship, the holder is permitted to
maintain the attorney-client privilege as against all others. 2 1 1 Therefore, the
208. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
209. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, § 5.15.
210. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (2000) (covering
communications between "a client, the client's agent for communication, the client's lawyer,

and the lawyer's agent" with those of another client sharing a "common interest" in a legal
matter); Susan K. Rushing, Separatingthe Joint-Defense Doctrinefrom the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1274 (1990) ("The joint-defense privilege protects

exchanges of information among parties who share common interests in defending against or
attacking a common opponent but who are represented by separate lawyers." (citations

omitted)). One of the earliest cases to recognize the joint-defense doctrine was Chahoon v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 836-39 (1871). Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note
47, § 5.15 n.2. Of course, the joint-defense privilege protects communications to third
parties of information not originally protected by the attorney-client privilege, as well as
privileged information later shared. See Rushing, supra, at 1284-85 ("The joint-defense
privilege protects information that clients pass on to third parties who share common
interests with the communicant whether or not the clients first conveyed the information to
their own attorneys, thereby protecting it with the attorney-client privilege.").

211. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, § 5.15 ("Each participant may assert the
privilege against outsiders, and all participants must consent to a general waiver of the
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attorney-client privilege is not only available at the traditional price of
complete confidentiality.
The joint-defense doctrine rests on policies independent of those that
support the attorney-client privilege itself. Because this doctrine protects
communications between even non-clients and counsel, it "hardly
encourages 'frank and thorough attorney-client communications.' ' 2 12 As
one commentator has noted, the joint-defense privilege must have some
"social value apart from that protected by the attorney-client privilege"
since the "reasons for the attorney-client privilege . . . do not support
extending the privilege to communications with third-party lawyers and
their clients." 213 Rather than promoting frank communication between
clients and their counsel, the joint-defense or common interest doctrine
encourages collaboration between separately represented parties "to
encourage better case preparation and reduce time and expense." 2 14 The
maintenance of the attorney-client privilege despite the sacrifice of
confidentiality serves the "general efficiency of legal representation by
giving parties the tactical advantage of access to information in the
possession of others. '2 15 Thus, existing privilege doctrine recognizes social
policies apart from fostering the frank and thorough communications
between counsel and client as sufficient to support exceptions to traditional
waiver doctrine.
Like the common interest doctrine, selective waiver encourages
cooperation and collaboration through the sharing of information with
government investigators. In the interest of the important public policy of
privilege." (citations omitted)); see also Rice, supra note 165, at 878-80 (noting the
expanding circle of confidentiality permitted by the "'common interest' category" that has
turned privilege protection "into little more than a right of privacy that the client can choose
to share with others, while preserving its viability"); Rushing, supra note 210, at 1278
(noting courts' tendencies to view the joint-defense doctrine as "an exception to the rule that
divulging confidential information to third parties waives the attorney-client privilege").
This is an example of a disclosure exempted from waiver because it is separately privileged.
See Fed. R. Evid. 511, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1973) (proposed 1972, not enacted). One
commentator has noted that the attorney-client privilege can be maintained despite
revelations of confidential communications to the client's spouse. Although such disclosures
are made to one outside the confidential attorney-client relationship, the privilege remains in
tact because the spousal communications are separately privileged. See Marcus, supra note
199, at 1605, 1625.
212. Rushing, supra note 210, at 1280 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id.
214. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, § 5.15; see also Rushing, supra note 210, at
1280 (noting that "[t]he joint-defense privilege encourages arrangements by which parties
may extract from other parties beneficial information or cooperation").
215. Rushing, supra note 210, at 1280. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognized this exception to confidentiality for a dual privilege holder by exempting
disclosures from waiver if those disclosures were themselves privileged. See Fed. R. Evid.
511, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1973) (proposed 1972, not enacted). As noted by Professor
Richard Marcus, "[T]his explanation fails to take account of the fact that the attorney-client
privilege has, under the strict view, lost its value because of revelation to another." Marcus,
supra note 199, at 1625.

2007]

PROPOSEDSELECTIVE WAIVER LEGISLATION

185

effective corporate law enforcement, selective waiver permits the voluntary
and tactical sacrifice of confidentiality to a specified audience, while
permitting the holder of the privilege to maintain secrecy against all others.
Indeed, selective waiver could be considered more protective of
confidentiality than the common interest privilege because it is more
narrowly tailored to permit disclosure only to a specified recipient-the
federal government, whereas the common interest doctrine permits sharing
with all parties with a rather loosely defined "common interest. ' 216 At its
core, the common interest privilege does what selective waiver does. It
allows the holder of the privilege to disclose confidential communications
to an outsider when such disclosure will afford some tactical advantage
necessary to effective legal representation. Similarly, selective waiver
allows a privilege holder the tactical advantage of sharing protected
information in a context that will advance the holder's effective legal
representation, as well as the public interest in effective corporate oversight,
while maintaining privilege protection as against other parties. Thus, the
breach of confidentiality that accompanies selective waiver is not inherently
inconsistent with the maintenance of privilege.
Critics of selective waiver might argue that the common interest doctrine
provides little support for the voluntary breach of confidential information
to the federal government because it does not permit such a breach to an
2 17
adversary, but rather insists upon "common interests" for its justification.
While disclosure to a party with similar interests may not be inconsistent
with the right to continued protection from compelled disclosure, voluntary
disclosure to an adversary such as the federal government is fundamentally
inconsistent with continued protection in any context. In analyzing such
arguments, it is important to emphasize the unique nature of the relationship
between government investigators and corporate targets. Unlike individual
defendants for whom the government represents a true adversary, corporate
216. Although the joint-defense doctrine is only applicable when the communicating

parties have a sufficient common interest, some courts have extended the common interest
doctrine to third parties not party to any pending litigation, as well as to a party's adversaries
who share a "common interest." See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th
Cir. 1987); Visual Scene v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 441-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987).

217. Despite the requirement of "common interests" between parties sharing information
under the joint-defense doctrine, it is universally accepted that parties pooling protected

information under a joint-defense agreement may, and often do, have conflicting interests as
well. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, § 5.15. Indeed, some commentators argue
that parties to a joint-defense arrangement should be prohibited from using shared

information against one another should subsequent litigation arise between the parties. See
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 126(2) (1998); Rushing, supra note
210, at 1298 ("The effective application of the joint defense privilege requires that the

privilege remain intact among the parties in a subsequent action."). Thus, the joint-defense
doctrine contemplates disclosures to a potential adversary accompanied by assurances that
the information cannot be used by that potential adversary should litigation arise. See also
Marcus, supra note 199, at 1638 (noting that "courts are fairly free in finding common
interests sufficient to avoid a waiver").
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targets of government investigation are controlled by groups of individuals,
many of whom may have little or no connection to the wrongdoing being
investigated by the government. In fact, a corporate target is often
controlled by new management untainted by prior malfeasance that
"partners" with the government in cleaning up and saving the corporate
entity.2 18 Seen in this light, the government investigators and the corporate
subjects of their investigation have a common interest in eradicating
corporate fraud despite the existence of the conflicting interests of some
individual employees and the sharing of information within this context
2 19
remains somewhat analogous to the common defense privilege.
Assuming that the joint-defense doctrine should be distinguished from
selective waiver because of the "common interest" requirement, courts have
also upheld the privilege even after confidential communications have been
disclosed to a true adversary. Under traditional privilege doctrine, even the
unintentional disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications to
an adversary constitutes a waiver of the privilege, at least with respect to the
communications disclosed. 220 Once lost, the requisite confidentiality of a
confidential communication cannot be resurrected. 22 1 Over time, courts
have moved away from such an unforgiving view of disclosure to one's
adversary, at least in the context of unintended disclosures. Rather than
analyzing waiver solely on the basis of lost confidentiality, modem courts
have looked to the care taken by the privilege holder in protecting his
confidential information, as well as the circumstances surrounding the
disclosure and the promptness of the holder's response to such
disclosure. 2 22 Courts have allowed continued protection following
inadvertent disclosure to an adversary where fairness to both parties
218. See Simons, supra note 2, at 1007-08.
219. Companies have argued that the sharing of work-product information with the
government did not waive work-product protection as against an "adversary" for this same
reason. The courts that have considered this argument have rejected it despite the realities of
allied interests among corporate counsel and government investigators. See Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting
argument by a cooperating corporation that the SEC and the DOJ were not "adversaries" for
purposes of the work-product doctrine where the corporation was the "target" of the agency
investigation at the time of disclosures to the agencies); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 820 (Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting the notion that the corporate target
and the government shared common interests).
220. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring that
parties "treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels-if not crown
jewels"); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("The Court will not look behind this objective fact to determine whether the plaintiff
really intended to have the letter examined. Nor will the Court hold that the inadvertence of
counsel is not chargeable to his client. Once the document was produced for inspection, it
entered the public domain. Its confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis for
the continued existence of the privilege."); Wigmore, supra note 47, § 2325(3), at 629
(explaining that a client bears the risk of "insufficient precautions" against disclosure).
221. See Marcus, supra note 199, at 1612 (noting that "classical waiver doctrine" holds
that any disclosure to an outsider destroys the attorney-client privilege).
222. See generally Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, § 5.29.
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justified maintenance of the privilege. 2 23 This doctrine of "inadvertent
waiver" has gained support in the federal system and proposed Federal Rule
502 seeks to codify this more flexible approach. 224 Like selective waiver,
this modem approach to inadvertent disclosure is not designed to encourage
the frank and full communication between a client and his lawyer. Instead,
it is driven by basic notions of fairness and responsibility. 225 Therefore,
modem privilege doctrine recognizes exceptions to third-party waiver that
are not supported by the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege.
Further, the modem approach to inadvertent waiver allows privilege
protection without making the holder pay the traditional price of complete
confidentiality

It is true that the doctrine of inadvertent waiver sanctions a loss of
confidentiality in a context decidedly different from that involved in
selective waiver to the extent that it permits only the "inadvertent" or

"accidental" disclosure of confidential information to one's adversary.

Indeed, several of the courts rejecting selective waiver have objected to the
intentional and tactical disclosure of confidential communications as
inconsistent with privilege. As outlined above, the joint-defense doctrine
permits disclosures for just such tactical reasons. It is not the only place in
evolving privilege law where we see purposeful and tactically advantageous
disclosures to one's adversary accompanied by maintenance of the
privilege, however. Due to the rising costs of massive document and
electronic discovery, the parties to complex litigation have encountered
increasing difficulty in performing the thorough privilege review necessary
223. This exception to the doctrine of waiver upon loss of confidentiality is not justified
through the increase in communications between client and counsel, but rather through
considerations of necessity and fairness. See Hopson v. City of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228
(D. Md. 2005).
224. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 8. At common law, all justification for foreclosing
use of privileged information by others was deemed lost once confidentiality was
compromised, whether through an intentional or inadvertent disclosure. Accordingly, some
courts have held that an inadvertent disclosure of protected information sacrifices crucial
confidentiality and, therefore, the privilege. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm., 122 F.3d 1409, 1417-18 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A few courts have come down on the
opposite side of the spectrum, finding no waiver for accidental or inadvertent disclosures and
requiring an "intentional" disclosure to trigger waiver. Most courts, however, have adopted
a middle ground approach allowing a waiver through inadvertent disclosure only where the
disclosing party has acted carelessly with respect to its privileged information. See Hopson,
232 F.R.D. at 235-36 (summarizing the case law regarding inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information). Proposed Rule 502(b) adopts this middle ground majority approach
to inadvertent waiver, requiring parties to treat their privileged information with care while
rejecting a rule of "strict liability for an inadvertent disclosure" which "threatens to impose
prohibitive costs for privilege review and retention, especially in cases involving electronic
discovery." May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 8.
225. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 243 (holding that findings of waiver due to inadvertent
production after reasonable precautions against disclosure were taken would be "unfair" and
"improper").
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to preserve confidentiality consistent with common law privilege
requirements. The time and expense associated with such privilege review
has become prohibitive and has increased concerns over waiver through
disclosure. Although disclosure to an adversary defeats the privilege under
traditional waiver doctrine, courts have entered protective orders in
complex litigation seeking to eliminate waiver through inadvertent
2 26
discovery disclosures.
The provisions of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 that have been
recommended by the Advisory Committee go one step further in relaxing
traditional waiver doctrine. In an effort to alleviate the burden associated
with complex discovery, the rule would permit federal court orders
sanctioning "claw-back" and "quick-peek" arrangements under which
parties may voluntarily produce documents to an adversary with limited or
no privilege review and then recall privileged materials after production.
So long as the arrangement is memorialized in a court order, the production
of confidential materials to one's adversary would not defeat a party's
assertion of the privilege in the instant litigation or any other proceeding in
any state or federal court. 2 27 Thus, these provisions permit parties
intentionally to compromise the confidentiality of privileged information to
an adversary in the interests of efficiency and preservation of resources in
complex civil litigation. 2 28 They do not encourage frank and full
communications with counsel. They do not require a party to jealously
guard its confidential information in order to rely upon the privilege. Yet
these provisions appear to have almost universal acceptance by the bar and
judiciary due to the practical
need for an alteration to waiver doctrine in
229
light of modem practice.
In light of the modem realities of corporate investigation and the massive
and intricate document trails that can only be navigated by an outsider with
great difficulty, modem waiver doctrine ought to recognize a party's
freedom to share privileged information with federal officials without a
corresponding loss of privilege in third-party litigation. Confidentiality is
no longer king. If the preservation of private litigation resources is a
sufficient justification for permitting knowing and purposeful exchanges of
confidential information without consequence to privilege, the public
interest in effective law enforcement and the preservation of public
investigatory resources is certainly sufficient to justify selective waiver to
government officials. Where all of waiver doctrine is being adjusted to
226. See Marcus, supra note 199, at 1611 (noting that courts "[i]n increasing numbers, ...
have entered orders, often on stipulation, that provide that inadvertent production of
privileged material through discovery is not a waiver").
227. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 11.
228. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 238 (describing the need for such agreements in the
context of contemporary electronic discovery).
229. See May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at 2-
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permit greater flexibility and less rigid adherence to common law
confidentiality requirements, it would be counterproductive to tell private
litigants that they may share with their "allies," they may share with their
private adversaries, but they will be punished for sharing with the federal
government in the pursuit of its law enforcement responsibility. Such a
disfavored status for cooperation with government investigations does not
serve the public interest any more than the needless waste of private
resources to review
millions
of documents
for privileged
230
communications.
Critics of selective waiver to government entities also argue that the
doctrine has the effect of creating a new "government investigation
privilege" and that new privileges should be recognized only sparingly so as
to decrease the amount of relevant information shielded from view in
litigation. 23' At first blush, this argument may have some appeal. 232 Where
selective waiver permits corporate clients to avoid sharing their protected
information with third parties, despite disclosure to the government, the
doctrine of selective waiver indeed takes on characteristics commonly
associated with new privileges. Although it may be tempting to condemn
the doctrine after framing it in this way, the effort to defeat selective waiver
233
by marking it as a "new privilege" represents a semantic "distraction."
First and foremost, the only protection to be afforded to the shared
information originates with the attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine existing internally within the corporate client.
Permitting
disclosure to the government without waiver as to third parties, therefore,
does not recognize protections for the government-corporation relationship
existing independently of the attorney-client relationship.
Thus, the
protection envisioned by the doctrine emanates entirely from existing
234
privileges.
Furthermore, unlike other common law privileges that ultimately shield
information from all adversaries and inhibit the truth-seeking process, the
230. The acceptance of more limited selective waiver protection for disclosures to
banking regulators also demonstrates that the concept can function within contemporary
privilege doctrine. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006).
231. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006); Dorris,

supra note 187, at 806 ("The limited waiver rule thus creates an SEC-corporation privilege,
with the attorney serving as the link between this new privilege and the traditional attorneyclient privilege.").
232. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit suggested that, in advocating a rule of selective waiver,
Qwest was seeking the "substantial equivalent of an entirely new privilege, i.e., a
government-investigation privilege." In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1197.
233. See Marcus, supra note 199, at 1641 (opining that "[w]here there has been ...an
undertaking [by the recipient of the protected information to hold it in confidence] ...the
charge that allowing the recipient to refuse to turn over privileged material creates a new
privilege is a distraction"). Marcus also notes that other accepted exceptions to waiver exist
without creating new "privileges." Id.
234. Id. at 1640 ("[T]he real source of privilege protection is the existing privilege, and
the real question is whether disclosure destroys that protection.").
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doctrine of selective waiver will ultimately increase the free flow of
information between the corporate client and the government. Rather than
burying relevant information from the view of all interested parties, the
doctrine of selective waiver will bring to light existing and otherwise
unavailable information for the benefit of the one adversary that always
serves the public interest when it litigates. Selective waiver cannot be
likened to a "new privilege" where its recognition will lead to a net increase
in information available to resolve federal investigations. Therefore,
selective waiver will further the core and predominant principle of
American evidence-to which privilege is a notable and limited
235
exception-that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence."
The doctrine of selective waiver is not only consistent with the evolving
judicial view of privilege and waiver, it is consistent with contemporary
scholarly treatment of privilege and waiver. Commentators have suggested
that we should reject the rigid and formulaic application of nineteenthcentury privilege doctrine, preferring a framework for waiver analysis that
takes into account the costs generated by waiver doctrine, as well as the
rights of litigants not privy to the attorney-client relationship. In 1986,
Professor Richard Marcus opined that waiver determinations ought not turn
on the purposes of the attorney-client privilege or lost confidentiality, but
rather should focus on the "unfairness flowing from the act on which the
waiver is premised. '236 Under Professor Marcus's theory of waiver, "there
is no reason for treating disclosure to opponents or others as a waiver unless
there is legitimate concern about truth garbling or the material has become
so notorious that decision without that material risks making a mockery of
237
justice."
Viewing waiver through this "fairness" lens supports selective disclosure
of privileged communications to government investigators without a
corresponding waiver of the privilege to third-party litigants. Because the
disclosure of protected material to government investigators in no way
disadvantages the civil adversaries of the disclosing entity, fairness does not
require disclosure to these adversaries. Plaintiffs in a securities class action
suit are no worse off than they would have been had the subject corporation

235. Wigmore, supra note 47, § 2192, at 64 (citations omitted).
236. Marcus, supra note 199, at 1607. Indeed, Professor Marcus notes that the Upjohn
model of corporate attorney-client privilege fails to serve the fundamental purpose of
encouraging frank and open communications to counsel by placing control over waiver
exclusively within the hands of the corporate client. Id. at 1622. He argues that if the
"traditional purpose" for the privilege does not explain privilege decisions in such contexts,
that same traditional purpose of encouraging frank and open communications "does not
provide a workable guideline for waiver decisions." Id. Professor Marcus opines that the
Supreme Court jurisprudence outwardly adheres to a utilitarian justification for privilege
while simultaneously "ensuring a zone of silence for [the] effective and ethical preparation
of cases." Id. at 1624.
237. Id. at 1608.
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not made any disclosures to the government. 238 Unlike the situation in
which a party makes a partial and misleading disclosure of privileged

information to an opponent, full disclosure to the government in a previous
investigation poses no threat of "truth garbling" in subsequent civil
litigation. In fact, civil plaintiffs are often helped by successful government
investigations, gaining quick access to important unprivileged information
they might not have received had the company not cooperated fully with
government officials. 23 9 Even some courts that have rejected selective
waiver have failed to recognize any unfairness to third-party civil litigants
from application of the doctrine. 240 In stating support for a rule of selective
waiver, the SEC has likewise noted that private litigants suffer no harm as a
result of such a rule. 24 1 Professor Marcus suggested that selective
disclosure to one party but not another is "not the dangerous type of
selective disclosure unless it leads to selective use of part of the material as
evidence, thereby raising the truth-garbling concern. Otherwise, there
seems to be little unfairness to B flowing from revelation to A, even if A
24 2
and B are adversaries."
In addition, Professor Paul Rice, another noted scholar in the area of
privilege law, has argued that confidentiality represents an atavistic and
logically unsupportable component of privilege and waiver doctrine. 243 He
has tracked the erosion of the confidentiality requirement through judicial

treatment of privilege and waiver and notes that confidentiality is necessary
for maintenance of the privilege "more in theory than in practice." 24 4 He
238. See Letter from Gregory P. Joseph to Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-003.pdf ("Nor is it unfair
to require civil plaintiffs to conduct their own discovery, without the benefit of materials
supplied to facilitate governmental investigations ....
).
239. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003) ("Private litigants may even benefit from the Commission's
ability to conduct more expeditious and thorough investigations. Indeed, many private
securities actions follow the successful completion of a Commission investigation and
enforcement action.").
240. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d Cir.
1991).
241. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6312 ("[P]reserving the privilege or protection for internal reports shared with the
Commission does not harm private litigants or put them at any kind of strategic
disadvantage. At worst, private litigants would be in exactly the same position that they
would have been in if the Commission had not obtained the privileged or protected
materials.").
242. Marcus, supra note 199, at 1639; see also Note, supra note 46, at 1655 ("Unfairness,
therefore, should form no part of a waiver analysis of selective disclosure.").
243. Rice, supra note 165, at 882 ("Judicial practices have made secrecy a non-essential
element to the privilege's continuation-suggesting that there is little justification for
imposing it in the first instance as a condition for the privilege's creation.").
244. Id. at 897. In addition to recognizing the loss of confidentiality inherent in
application of limited or selective waiver, Professor Paul Rice also cites the treatment of
common interest circumstances, inadvertent waivers, and collateral estoppel effect of prior
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argues in favor of taking the next step to eliminate the confidentiality
requirement even at the creation of the attorney-client privilege, claiming
that it is the holder's control over the use of his communications rather than
their confidentiality which supports the privilege. 24 5 According to
Professor Rice, eliminating the useless tradition of confidentiality will serve
to eliminate the significant costs it imposes in creating, maintaining, and
ascertaining the existence of privilege. 246 Consistent with this perspective,
the voluntary loss of confidentiality inherent in selective waiver does not
undermine core principles of privilege where the holder maintains control
of the protected information following disclosure to
over the dissemination
247
the government.
The doctrine of selective waiver is consistent with the evolving
interpretation of waiver by the courts and rule makers and survives scrutiny
under contemporary scholarly interpretation of the fundamental components
of privilege and waiver. Thus, there remains little reason for the continued
disfavored status of a doctrine that will protect and promote good corporate
citizenship, as well as the public interest. Selective waiver is a concept
whose time has arrived.
C. Is FederalSelective Waiver Legislation the Answer?
Some opponents of selective waiver may point to the Evidence Advisory
Committee's decision to eliminate selective waiver from the proposed new
evidence rule as a defeat of the doctrine on the merits. To the contrary, the
Advisory Committee's action on selective waiver did not signal substantive
rejection of the concept. Further, the decision to excise the selective waiver
provision from the proposed evidence rule did not erect any barrier
procedurally to the proposal.
First, the Advisory Committee did not reject the concept of selective
waiver on the merits as a part of its action on Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
The report that the committee sent to the Standing Committee declined to
take any position on the doctrine, noting the public commentary on both
sides of the issue. 248 The committee recognized that some of the disputed
issues raised by the doctrine, such as the alleged "culture of waiver" in
federal law enforcement, were not evidence issues appropriate for ruleprivilege determinations as evidence of confidentiality's decreasing importance in the courts.
Id.
245. Id. at 888 ("The privilege's protection of the use of a client's statements to counsel is
what encourages openness and candor in such communications.").
246. Id. at 897-98.
247. Recently, scholars have begun to move even further away from the rigid absolutism
inherent in Dean John Henry Wigmore's formulation of privilege. Professor Edward
Imwinkelried has suggested that an absolute privilege comes at too great a cost in lost
evidence and that a qualified privilege could better serve societal interests. See Imwinkelried,
supra note 200, at 180.
248. See generally May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra
note 17.
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making action, but rather "political" issues best left to Congress. In an
effort to give Congress the benefit of its research on the topic, the Advisory
Committee provided a draft cover letter to Congress on selective waiver in
its report to the Standing Committee, including draft language for a federal
selective waiver statute. 249 Therefore, the Evidence Advisory Committee in
no way rejected selective waiver, but simply found the concept to be
250
outside its jurisdiction.
In addition, the severance of the selective waiver provision from
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 does alter fundamentally the
procedural posture of selective waiver protection. Because selective waiver
deals with the attorney-client privilege, Congress would have had to sign
off on it even if it had proceeded with the remainder of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502.25 1 While taking no position on selective waiver, the
Evidence Advisory Committee did a significant amount of work in
marshalling the pertinent information on the doctrine and has packaged it
for Congress to take over. 252 In light of all the interest in selective waiver
and all the work that has been done on the proposal thus far, it appears
certain that the Advisory Committee's report on selective waiver and draft
statutory language will find its way onto the agenda of the House or Senate
Judiciary Committee for consideration at some point. Therefore, while the
decision to drop the provision from the proposed evidence rule may put a
selective waiver proposal on a slightly different procedural track, the issue
remains very much alive. Given that Congress included a narrow selective
waiver provision benefiting the banking industry in the Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, there is clearly some congressional support
for the subject. 253 Still, it is certain that the sound and fury that animated

discussion in the rule-making process will follow the
the selective waiver 254
concept to Congress.

249. Id.
250. Id.; see also Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 272 (noting that "[u]ltimately, the
decision of whether to include the selective waiver section is the kind of public policy

decision appropriately left to Congress").
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000). Section 2074(b) provides that an "Act of Congress"
is necessary for "[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege
.." Id.
252. See generally May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra

note 9.
253. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006).
254. See Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 269 (noting the controversy that attended the
selective waiver provision in the rule-making process). Interestingly, the selective waiver
debate reflects overtones of the "power theory" of privilege that asserts that "the real roots of
privilege law lie in the power of those benefiting from it." Note, supra note 46, at 1493. The
powerful corporate bar uniformly supports the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 502,
which have been proposed by the Advisory Committee to ease the costs of complex
discovery, and strongly opposes the selective waiver provision, which has been dropped. See
generally May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17.
"Despite the radical overtones of the power theory, many mainstream commentators have
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It is true that there has been a preference for common law development
of privilege and waiver doctrine in the federal arena, but common law
development is ill suited to providing the protection sought by corporate
selective waiver. 255 Judicial recognition of the protection in one circuit
would accomplish little for corporate actors amenable to suit in various
jurisdictions. Forum shopping based upon access to otherwise privileged
corporate information would be sure to follow sporadic judicial recognition
As commentators have noted, a legislative
of the protection. 256
all
circuits is the only mechanism by which the
in
binding
pronouncement
be truly effective. 25 7 Congress could take
can
waiver
doctrine of selective
different paths to achieve selective waiver protection. Congress could enact
selective waiver legislation to be included within the Federal Rules of
Evidence even though the Evidence Advisory Committee recommended no
action on the proposal. 258 On the other hand, Congress could enact
selective waiver legislation as a separate statute within the U.S. Code.
Enacting selective waiver as part of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 or as a
companion Federal Rule of Evidence would combine all comprehensive
changes to traditional waiver doctrine in a single location easily accessible
within 59the Federal Rules of Evidence and appears to be the preferable
route. 2
The draft language composed by the Evidence Advisory Committee
provides an excellent starting point for selective waiver legislation. By
acknowledged the role of political power in the development of privilege law." Note, supra
note 46, at 1494.
255. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
rule Qwest advocates would be a leap, not a natural, incremental next step in the common
law development of privileges and protections.").
256. Federal legislation also will resolve any concerns regarding the conflicting
obligations imposed on the government by the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., Dorris,
supra note 187, at 806-11 (discussing conflict between the Freedom of Information Act and
a common law limited waiver rule that could be resolved through federal legislation); Janet
L. Hall, Note, "Limited Waiver" of ProtectionAfforded by the Attorney-Client Privilegeand
the Work Product Doctrine, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 981, 1002-03.
257. See Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 217 ("If there is going to be a consistent
solution, it is going to have to come by rule or statute."); Hall, supra note 256, at 1004
("Ideally, Congress should consider passing legislation allowing a limited waiver
rule .. ");Raymond E. Watts, Jr., Comment, Reconciling Voluntary Disclosure with the
Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: A Move Toward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver
Doctrine, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1341, 1352 (1988) (opining that a "statute is preferable to
judicial action because it gives the explicit guidance needed by corporate counsel
contemplating disclosure of confidential information").
258. Congress has previously enacted federal rules of evidence that were contrary to the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee. See Fed. R. Evid. 413-415 (enacted as part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994); see also Broun & Capra,
supra note 109, at 218 (noting that "the congressional enactment could be in the form of an
addition to the federal rules").
259. On the other hand, one might argue that the Federal Rules of Evidence are the last
place a state litigant would look to determine its rights and that a separate statute might make
more sense if the provision is made applicable to state courts. See infra notes 262-63 and
accompanying text.
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protecting corporations disclosing privileged information to any and all
federal entities, the draft statute would provide comprehensive protection
that none of the previous regulatory or legislative selective waiver
proposals would have achieved. 260 The original selective waiver provision
deleted from Federal Rule of Evidence 502 would have protected
corporations cooperating with federal entities from findings of waiver in
both federal and state courts. 26 1 In response to federalism concerns over
altering existing waiver rules in state proceedings, the Advisory Committee
has proposed two options for congressional consideration-one applicable
262
in state and federal proceedings and one applicable only in federal court.
The protection to be afforded by federal selective waiver legislation will be
meaningful only if applicable in state courts. Corporations are amenable to
suit in state courts on numerous claims-selective waiver protection will
achieve little in the way of increased corporate cooperation if companies
cannot rely upon it in this arena as well. 26 3 Further, while state court
application may raise federalism concerns, scholars have suggested that it
would raise no genuine constitutional problem. 264 Thus, Congress will
need to make the protection effective in state, as well as in federal, courts if
selective waiver legislation is to accomplish its objectives.
Even with this additional coverage, federal selective waiver legislation
may provide imperfect protection to disclosing corporations. Because
federal offices and agencies would need to pass on privileged corporate
information disclosed as otherwise required by law, some information could
be shared beyond the federal agency to whom the corporation originally
discloses. 265 For example, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
and the Supreme Court's holding in Brady v. Maryland, the government
260. Several previous proposals would have protected disclosures to the SEC only. See
supra note 110. In addition, the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 provides
selective waiver protection for disclosures to federal and state banking regulators only. 12
U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006).
261. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
262. The draft statutory language makes applicability to state proceedings provisional by
placing the term "state" in brackets throughout the draft statute. See May 15, 2007, Report of

the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on
Selective Waiver, at 4.
263. See Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 246 ("Controlling subsequent use of matters
disclosed . . . to federal regulators in all courts, state and federal, is essential if such
limitations are to be meaningful to the parties.").
264. Although the application of selective waiver protection in state court proceedings
may invite constitutional challenges, the Advisory Committee has concluded that the
provision would pass constitutional muster if enacted by Congress pursuant to its Commerce
Clause authority. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra
note 9, at Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 5; see also Mitchell, supra note 107, at 739
(opining that "[s]elective waiver legislation that binds state courts would be a valid exercise
of Congressional power provided that it is (1) clearly rooted in an enumerated federal power;
(2) clearly evinces an intent to create a substantive right; and (3) clearly expresses an intent
to bind state courts").
265. May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R.
Evid. (Proposed 2006), at 9.
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would be obligated to share privileged corporate information with any
individual criminal defendant to the extent that the corporate information
could be deemed "material" to the defense of the individual. 26 6 Indeed,
federal courts have ordered government disclosure of corporate internal
investigation information on this basis. 26 7 Further, although it would
protect disclosing corporations from findings of waiver in favor of thirdparty litigants, selective waiver legislation would place no limitations on the
268
use of protected corporate information by the federal entity receiving it.
The federal entity could disclose protected information publicly even when
not legally obligated to do so. 269 The government's use of privileged
corporate information in a public trial or other proceeding could undermine
a company's interests in continued confidentiality. In rejecting selective
waiver protection, the Tenth Circuit in In re Qwest recently echoed
concerns raised by Professor Marcus some twenty years ago about
widespread sharing and continued protection of information. Some may
argue that the continued protection of information that has been shared in an
open and notorious fashion could, in some circumstances, threaten to turn
any proceeding in which the information is suppressed into a mockery of
justice.2 70 There is concern, therefore, that disclosure of protected
corporate information by the federal government could defeat a company's
ability to shield the information from civil adversaries even if selective
waiver legislation is adopted.
The draft statute prepared by the Evidence Advisory Committee would
resolve this potential concern with a bright-line rule protecting corporations
from waivers in favor of all other parties "regardless of the extent of

266. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) ("[S]uppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) (requiring the government to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph documents that are in the possession, custody
or control of the government and that are material to the preparation of the defense).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 502 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering
the government to produce an internal investigation report prepared by outside corporate
counsel and interview memoranda to former company executives being prosecuted for
securities, wire, and mail fraud pursuant to Brady and Fed. R. Crim. P. 16).
268. May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at Draft

of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 4-5. The draft statutory language
provides that the rule "does not ...limit or expand a government office or agency's
authority to disclose communications or information to other government offices or agencies
or as otherwise authorized or required by law." Id. at Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on
Selective Waiver, at 4. The committee note accompanying the draft statutory language also
specifies that, "The rule does not purport to affect the disclosure of protected
communications or information after receipt by the federal office or agency." Id. at Draft of
Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 5.
269. Id.
270. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006);
Marcus, supra note 199, at 1641-42.
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disclosure" by the government entity. 27 1 A draft committee note included
with the statutory language specifies, "Even if the communications or
information are used in an enforcement proceeding and so become publicly
available, the communications or information will continue to be protected
as against other persons or entities." 272 This bright-line protection should
be incorporated into any legislative proposal if selective waiver is to
achieve its goal of encouraging corporate cooperation. If the legislative
protection were entirely dependent upon the government's ultimate use of
the disclosed information, it would give a target corporation little assurance
at the outset when it is weighing the costs and benefits of cooperation. The
absence of clear statutory language regarding the effects of government use
of corporate information would reintroduce the very risk that threatens to
stifle corporate cooperation under current waiver doctrine. Thus, Congress
should include clear language in any proposed statute prohibiting any
waiver as a result of government dissemination of privileged corporate
information.
Another hole in the selective waiver protection envisioned by the
Evidence Advisory Committee involves privileged disclosures made to
state government agencies and investigators.
The selective waiver
provision originally drafted for the Advisory Committee provided
protection from findings of waiver based upon corporate disclosures to
federal and state government entities. 27 3 The protection for disclosures to
state agencies was dropped from the proposed rule prior to its publication
for notice and comment, and the draft statutory language to be sent to
Congress similarly covers only disclosures to federal entities. 2 74 It makes
sense to limit the scope of federal selective waiver legislation to
encouraging cooperation with the federal government in the pursuit of its
oversight obligations. 2 75 Federal legislation governing the ramifications of
disclosures originally made at the state level would present significant
federalism concerns. 276 Furthermore, the absence of protection at the state
271. May 15, 2007, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 17, at Draft
of Cover Letter to Congress on Selective Waiver, at 5.
272. Id.
273. See Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 248, 262 (noting that subsection (b)(3) of the
original draft of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 provided protection for disclosures to state
regulators).
274. The committee omitted the protection at the state level because it believed that a
federal rule governing disclosures at the state level would need "an especially strong
justification" that was lacking. See id. at 262.
275. Id. at 266 ("Shouldn't the decision of whether selective waiver is useful in limiting
the costs of state investigations be left to the state?").
276. Although Congress may have the power to enact a rule governing disclosures made
at the state level, commentators have noted the comity concerns that arise in providing
selective waiver protection for cooperation with state entities where the law of the state does
not. Id. ("It might be thought too drastically contrary to comity to impose a federal law based
on the premise of limiting the cost of government investigations, where the investigation is
being pursued by a state entity in a state without a selective waiver provision."). Like the
federal courts, several state courts have rejected the protection of selective waiver under state
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level will not dilute the protection afforded by federal selective waiver.
Even without protection at the state level, companies will enjoy certainty
with respect to their disclosures to federal investigators. 277 Federal
evidence law has played a crucial role in guiding the states regarding best
practices, and federal selective waiver legislation could serve as a valuable
278
model for state jurisdictions contemplating similar protections.
In drafting language for a selective waiver statute, the Advisory
Committee chose to omit any requirement that the government and
cooperating corporation enter a confidentiality agreement in order to obtain
selective waiver protection. 279 The committee found that a confidentiality
agreement between the government and the privilege holder was not a
necessary precondition to a selective waiver rule because "[u]ltimately, the
obtaining of a confidentiality agreement has little to do with the underlying
policy of furthering cooperation with government agencies that animates
280
the rule."
The goal of efficient law enforcement through corporate cooperation is
not entirely unrelated to the presence of an agreement between the
government and the disclosing party, however. 28 1 If the proposed
privilege doctrine, depriving cooperating companies of the benefit of their attorney-client
and work-product protections when facing civil litigants. See, e.g., McKesson HBOC, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 820-21 (Ct. App. 2004); McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610
S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (Ga. 2005) (denying selective waiver of attorney-client and work-product
protections in connection with government investigations). It is possible that there is a
legitimate federal interest in encouraging corporate disclosures to state investigators as well.
The federal government could achieve valuable assistance from active corporate oversight
by state governments. If so, the federal interest could also be served by selective waiver
protection for disclosures to state entities. Indeed, Congress provided selective waiver
protection for disclosures to both federal and state banking regulators in the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(x)(1) (2006) (providing that
disclosures to federal and state banking regulators do not waive privileges as to private
parties). For the sake of legislative efficiency, Congress should consider this issue as part of
any selective waiver proposal.
277. As noted by the authors of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, "Most of the horror
stories... have arisen in federal and not state proceedings." Broun & Capra, supra note 109,
at 262.
278. See Mini-Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, supra note 16, at 5760 (testimony of Peter B. Pope, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the State of New York) (discussing
investigation and prosecution of white collar crime at state level and efforts to obtain "a
similar common law exception in New York State").
279. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
280. See May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at
Fed. R. Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 10.
281. At least one federal agency has suggested that the government's willingness to agree
to confidentiality is strongly tied to the government's need for disclosure and cooperation to
streamline an ongoing investigation. In withdrawing the proposed SEC selective waiver
regulation initially drafted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC noted that it enters
confidentiality agreements only when investigators feel that obtaining the protected
information will save substantial time and resources and/or provide more prompt monetary
relief to investors. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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legislation is designed to encourage protected disclosures to the government
in cases where such disclosures will significantly advance the efficiency
and efficacy of a particular investigation, the government ought to have
some continuing role in defining the class of cases where such disclosures
are imperative and thus, where waiver protection is warranted.2 82 The
government's agreement that corporate information should be withheld
from third-party litigants could signal its need for the corporate information
disclosed. Further, if selective waiver legislation is to tread on established
waiver doctrine only as narrowly as is necessary, it seems that some predisclosure agreement between the privilege holder and the government
would demonstrate the holder's genuine ex ante concern over downstream
dissemination in a manner most consistent with traditional concepts of
privilege and waiver. 28 3 Finally, requiring an agreement as to the effect of
privileged disclosures to the government could serve to curtail alleged
abuses of the federal cooperation policies currently under fire. Such an
agreement could document whether the government "requested" the waiver,
thus triggering the new procedural and substantive limitations on such
requests outlined in the McNulty Memo. 284 Therefore, some agreement
between the corporate privilege holder and government seems most
consistent with the purposes of the protection and traditional waiver
doctrine.
The Advisory Committee rejected a confidentiality agreement
requirement as unworkable and dangerous, expressing concerns that the
very uncertainty the rule was designed to erase would be reintroduced by
government inability to promise perfect confidentiality. 2 85
The
committee's fears are well founded. In order to make effective use of the

282. In rethinking the general approach to waiver doctrine and selective waiver
specifically, Professor Marcus has noted that waiver analysis presents a problem of clearly
identifying who can be within the "charmed circle" of privilege without working a waiver.
Marcus, supra note 199, at 1641. According to Professor Marcus, the most reasonable

formulation includes those actors who have agreed to maintain confidentiality. Id. Therefore
traditional acceptance of confidentiality would limit selective waiver in a manner more
consistent with the common law.
283. See Note, supra note 46, at 1653 (noting that, under this "free market approach" to
limited waiver, "the only corporations to receive the limited waiver treatment would be the
ones that would not have chosen to cooperate without the additional encouragement of
special treatment").
284. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. An agreement that would trigger
such procedural hurdles for the government would create true mutuality. Agreeing to
selective waiver protection would not be costless for the government. This could control any
government willingness to agree to selective waiver protection in investigations where
access to privileged documents can and should be avoided.
285. May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R.
Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 9 ("If a confidentiality agreement were a condition to
protection, disputes would be likely to arise over whether a particular agreement was
sufficiently air-tight to protect against a finding of a general waiver, thus destroying the
predictability that is essential to proper administration of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product immunity.").
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corporate disclosures, the government will be unable to agree to strict
confidentiality provisions that would limit its ability to prosecute or
regulate using the information provided. 286 Courts may find government
agreements retaining sufficient flexibility inadequate to trigger selective
waiver protection for the disclosing entity. Illustrating the Advisory
Committee's prediction, the Tenth Circuit rejected Qwest Communication's
claim of selective waiver despite confidentiality agreements negotiated with
both the SEC and the DOJ, finding:
The record does not indicate whether Qwest negotiated or could have
negotiated for more protection of the Waiver Documents, or whether, as it
asserted at oral argument, seeking further restrictions would have so
diluted its cooperation to render it valueless. Be that as it may, the
confidentiality agreements gave the agencies broad discretion to use the
Waiver Documents
as they saw fit, and any restrictions on their use were
loose in practice. 287
Concerned that parties relying on new selective waiver legislation would
have their expectations disappointed by such detailed review of
confidentiality agreements, the Advisory Committee drafted the statutory
language without any agreement condition at all. 288 While requiring a
"confidentiality" agreement as part of the rule is unworkable for the reasons
advanced by the committee, the statute could require pre-disclosure "mutual
selection" of full selective waiver protection. Once such a "mutual
selection" has been made by both the government and the privilege holder,
the full protections of selective waiver granted by the legislation would
apply. This would eliminate judicial autopsies of specific agreements that
threaten to undermine the protection promised by the proposed legislation,
but allow for continuing mutuality between federal entities and privilege
holders on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION

The time for federal legislation protecting parties that disclose privileged
information in cooperation with federal government investigations is
overdue. Exchanging leniency for cooperation represents a well-accepted
and time-honored law enforcement technique. For over three decades,
federal government entities have utilized that technique to encourage
voluntary disclosures from corporate entities to facilitate efficient and
successful investigations of organizational malfeasance. Such disclosures
by corporate targets have proven to be valuable weapons in the fight against
286. Broun & Capra, supra note 109, at 269 (noting that the Advisory Committee found
that the SEC needed "flexibility" in order to fulfill its enforcement obligations and that the
SEC "could not be bound to absolute nondisclosure").
287. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006).
288. May 15, 2006, Report of the Evidence Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at Fed. R.
Evid. 502 (Proposed 2006), at 9.
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corporate fraud-a fight that has faced increasing challenges in recent
years. Despite controversy over existing government cooperation policies,
voluntary disclosure in some form promises to remain as an important
feature in corporate investigations-with or without selective waiver
protection.
Federal selective waiver legislation would close one big door that is wide
open under existing law. Plaintiffs suing corporations beset by government
investigations in parallel civil proceedings will no longer be permitted to
demand protected corporate material simply because the company
voluntarily provided it to the federal government. As evidenced by some of
the recent cases rejecting corporate pleas for selective waiver to government
officials in just such contexts, this is an area of vulnerability that is critical
to cooperating corporations.2 89 This added protection will serve not only
the corporate interest in effective resolution of agency investigations, but
also the greater public interest in effective law enforcement and stable
corporations participating in our market. Furthermore, selective waiver can
fit comfortably into the contemporary flexible paradigm of privilege and
waiver.
With a proposal that would offer comprehensive waiver protection finally
on the table, corporate counsel appear poised to snatch defeat from the jaws
of victory by raising a loud hue and cry in opposition. It is certain that the
political controversy that animated the rule-making proceeding will follow
the proposal to Congress. If the proposal's opponents are successful, they
are most likely to perpetuate the universe in which we currently operate for
their clients-namely, the continuation of federal policies that generate
some privileged disclosures to the government with no selective waiver
protection to provide cover for corporations faced with massive civil
exposure. The public will be the ultimate loser, foregoing other corporate
information that could preserve valuable federal resources and aid in the
effective battle against corporate criminal activity.

289. See, e.g., In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1179; In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
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